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IS IT TIME FOR A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS ACT?
PURSUING PROCEDURAL JUSTICE IN THE
FEDERAL CIVIL COURT SYSTEM
SUZETTE M. MALVEAUX*
Abstract: The United States has recently been engaged in some of the largest
civil rights movements since the 1960s—from Black Lives Matter to #MeToo—
and calls for justice for marginalized communities are stronger than ever. Many
decry the longstanding violence and systemic discrimination such communities
experience, and advocate for stronger substantive civil rights. What has received
less attention, however, is the violence done to those rights by the U.S. Supreme
Court’s obstructionist civil procedural jurisprudence. Over the last half century,
the Court has systemically eroded Americans’ capacity to enforce such substantive rights in the civil court system. This erosion arcs away from the constitutional imperative that everyone has the right to be heard. Thus, the time has come for
a new civil rights act, grounded in process.
This Article examines the Court’s regressive process-based decisions over
the last fifty years, particularly regarding pleadings, class actions, and arbitration.
It demonstrates how the Court’s jurisprudence has reached a tipping point and
concludes that corrective civil rights legislation—rather than caselaw or a federal
© 2022, Suzette M. Malveaux. All rights reserved.
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rule—is the answer. The Article asks whether this is the right time for a new civil
rights act, comparing contemporary conditions with those of the sweeping Civil
Rights Act of 1991 and the targeted Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. Having answered the question affirmatively, the article sets forth normatively what a procedural civil rights restoration act should comprise. The Article concludes that its
prescription would realign drafters’ intentions, institutional competencies and
democratic values with the public dispute resolution system.
Justice too long delayed is justice denied.
—Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.1

INTRODUCTION
The United States has been in one of the largest civil rights movements
since the 1960s, and calls for justice for Black and marginalized communities
are stronger than ever.2 Many decry the violence that such communities have
experienced due to centuries of systemic racism and discrimination. This criticism has led to significant, though insufficient, legislative gains. What has received comparatively scant attention, however, is the violence done to those
legislative gains, and to civil rights more generally, through the U.S. Supreme
Court’s increasingly obstructionist civil-procedural jurisprudence.
Over the last half-century, the Supreme Court has chipped away at the
process that everyday people use to access and employ the civil court system
to resolve their grievances and seek remedies. The U.S. Constitution promises
due process, yet meaningful court access has become increasingly politicized,
compromised, and commodified. The Court has systemically eroded Americans’ capacity to protect and enforce their substantive rights. This regressive
trend has become even more acute in the last quarter-century.
The Court’s increasing resistance toward process that supports private
rights of action has endangered various substantive rights. This Article focuses
on federal statutory and constitutional civil rights, because of their fundamental place in American history—and their particularly precarious future.
Over several decades, the pendulum has swung from judicial support for
robust, private enforcement of civil rights to intolerance of, if not outright hostility to, such claims. Less obvious, but no less harmful, has been the way procedure has undermined, and even eradicated, civil litigation designed to re1
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., Letter from Birmingham Jail, in WHY WE CAN’T WAIT 64, 76
(1963).
2
Larry Buchanan, Quoctrung Bui & Jugal K. Patel, Black Lives Matter May Be the Largest
Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/07/
03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html [https://perma.cc/3GQ5-CM6Q].
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dress these grievances. The cumulative effect of such procedural jurisprudence
has been to obstruct court access and substantive rights contrary to the lawmakers’ and federal rule-makers’ intentions.3
Deprivation of court access and denial of merits determinations arcs away
from the constitutional imperative that everyone has the right to be heard.4
Marbury v. Madison explains that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty certainly
consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury.”5 As Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has noted,
the Court’s systemic court-blocking has “rendered hollow its assurance in
Marbury,” as it has failed to furnish remedies to victims of government misconduct.6
Procedural justice also sets a dignity floor: “If democracy means anything
morally, it signifies that the lives of all citizens matter, and that their sense of
their rights must prevail. Everyone deserves a hearing at the very least . . . .”7
Not only do access and process level the playing field, but they also promote
democratic values.8 Professor Judith Resnik has noted that courts are democratic institutions, whereas the general public and other government branches
form, test, and judge the law.9
The Court’s obstructionism, however, has been neither absolute nor uniform, making it hard to address. It is death by a thousand cuts—the insidious
power of incrementalism. Moreover, some civil rights lawyers have deftly navigated these higher procedural hurdles, incorrectly suggesting that the system
is not broken. The reward for such resilience, however, is more of the same.
The fact that some judges may be sympathetic to plaintiffs’ plights also provides little comfort. Outcomes hinge precariously on the political and personal
leanings of individuals, rather than on uniform, predictable standards. This is
3
The trend is from a “liberal ethos” to a “restrictive” one. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Restrictive
Ethos in Civil Procedure, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 353, 353, 358–69 (2010); see also Alexandra D.
Lahav, The Roles of Litigation in American Democracy, 65 EMORY L.J. 1657, 1700 (2016) (explaining that current movements toward a restrictive ethos are using procedural law instead of substantive
law); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 288 (2013) (arguing
that the current trend in procedural jurisprudence damages democracy and hurts the justice system).
4
FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 311
(4th ed. 1992).
5
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
6
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT 197–98 (2014).
7
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 35 (1990) (emphasis added).
8
See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 88, 91 (2011) (noting that adjudication is a
democratic procedure that promotes respectful interactions).
9
Id. at 79–80, 87–88, 91–92, 170. See generally Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J.
1073 (1984) (arguing against the trend toward encouraging settlement and alternative dispute resolution).
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not only fundamentally unfair, but it also undermines confidence in judicial
process and outcomes. This Article asks whether meaningful access to and use
of the civil court system has regressed to the point of requiring legislative resuscitation for constitutional and civil rights claims. The answer is yes.
At first blush, it may seem counterintuitive to urge procedural reform.
There is no dearth of major substantive issues to address: war abroad, a global
pandemic, racialized police brutality, sexual violence, inhumane immigrant
treatment, voter suppression, gun violence, mass incarceration, global warming, and crushing poverty and wealth disparities, among others. Comprehensive and transformative law is needed to address these crises.10
Prioritizing process reform is admittedly difficult, until one considers the
futility of substantive rights without procedural protections.11 Procedure was
created in the service of substance.12 Given the turbulent times, the civil justice
system must, at a minimum, properly function to enforce existing constitutional and civil rights. Too much is at stake. This Article challenges lawmakers to
take the modest, but imperative, step of crafting process law that ensures real
access to justice embodied in substantive-rights law.13
Although perpetual gridlock and hyper-partisanship characterize current
U.S. politics, visionary lawmaking is required and is starting to take hold. For
example, the recent bi-partisan Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault
10
Examples include: John R. Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2021, H.R. 4, 117th
Cong. (2021); Freedom to Vote Act, S. 2747, 117th Cong. (2021); Justice for All Act of 2020, H.R.
8698, 116th Cong. (2020); Creating a Respectful and Open World for Natural Hair (“CROWN”) Act
of 2022, H.R. 2116, 117th Cong. (2022); Civil Rights Enhancement and Law Enforcement Accountability Improvement Act of 2021, H.R. 1489, 117th Cong. (2021); Ending Qualified Immunity Act,
H.R. 1470, 117th Cong. (2021); Equality Act, H.R. 5, 117th Cong. (2021); Democracy Restoration
Act of 2021, S. 481, 117th Cong. (2021).
11
See J. Maria Glover, “Encroachments and Oppressions”: The Corporatization of Procedure
and the Decline of Rule of Law, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2113, 2125 (2018) (“Procedure has long been
the battleground for . . . those who seek to limit their exposure to liability.” (footnote omitted)); Stephen B. Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1677, 1723 (2004); Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 189–90 (2004).
See generally SEAN FARHANG, THE LITIGATION STATE (2010) (exploring the history and role of private enforcement of federal laws).
12
See generally Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L.Q. 297 (1938) (emphasizing the importance of procedure).
13
See ALEXANDRA LAHAV, IN PRAISE OF LITIGATION 148 (2017) (noting that “[l]itigation is a
social good and promotes democracy”). Admittedly, the civil litigation system itself is limited. Its focus
on individual accountability and compensatory relief, in contrast to systemic change and transformative
solutions, falls short. See Charles M. Blow, Opinion, The Civil Rights Act of 2020, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/opinion/police-brutality-protests-legislation.html [https://
perma.cc/7BPX-FSWF]; The BREATHE Act, M4BL, http://breatheact.org/ [https://perma.cc/US6TSHUN] (proposing sweeping changes to reform policing, accountability, and community development); About, BLACK LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/ [https://perma.cc/W8Z8B2V2].
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and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021—which President Biden signed and the
Senate unanimously passed—amends the Federal Arbitration Act to prohibit
enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration agreements in cases involving sexual
assault and sexual harassment claims.14 This groundbreaking legislation is an
excellent start.
It is time to go even further, to cover a greater array of procedural barriers
and a broader swath of Americans. Court access is more about people than partisanship. Procedural injustice disproportionately impacts the poor and powerless, of all political stripes.15 Women challenging sexual harassment on the job,
veterans challenging untenable delays in medical benefits, African-Americans
challenging police violence, low-income people challenging draconian lending
terms, and small businesses challenging monopolistic practices all benefit from a
civil court system more geared toward providing them their day in court. Enhancing court access promotes rule of law, democracy, and justice for everyone.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes how Supreme Court jurisprudence over the past fifty years has undermined private enforcement of
constitutional and civil rights claims through process-based decisions.16 The
Court’s ongoing statutory misinterpretation of federal procedural rules and
statutes—in areas such as pleadings, class actions and arbitration—illustrates
this retraction. This regressive pattern tees up the normative question of
whether the pendulum has swung too far, to the point of obstructionism. The
extent and gravity of the court-access problem is contested.17 This Part con14
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, H.R. 4445,
117th Cong. (2021).
15
Glover, supra note 11, at 2114. See generally Myriam Gilles, When Law Forsakes the Poor, in
A GUIDE TO CIVIL PROCEDURE 162 (Brooke Coleman, Suzette Malveaux, Portia Pedro & Elizabeth
Porter eds., 2022).
16
See infra notes 22–281 and accompanying text.
17
Compare Adam N. Steinman, Notice Pleading in Exile, 41 CARDOZO L. REV. 1057, 1064
(2020) (arguing that notice pleading still exists after Iqbal), Sunita Patel, Jumping Hurdles to Sue the
Police, 104 MINN. L. REV. 2257, 2269 (2020) (acknowledging procedural obstacles to plaintiffs), and
Linda S. Mullenix, Is the Arc of Procedure Bending Towards Injustice?, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 611,
611–12 (2019) (examining the record of the Supreme Court’s procedural rulings), with Spencer, supra
note 3, at 353, 358–67(stating that a “restrictive ethos” in procedure exists today), Miller, supra note
3, at 288 (asserting that procedural barriers to plaintiffs have increased), Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas
O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1853 (2014) (listing
how pleading standards have changed since 1976), Myriam Gilles, The Day Doctrine Died: Private
Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 372–74 (stating that conservatives sought
to curtail private lawsuits), Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 421 (2005) (exploring other industries
where class action waivers may become more prevalent), and Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing
Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment
Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 517, 527–36, 556–61 (2010) (detailing how pleading standards have been elevated).
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tends that the Court has reached a tipping point—the apex of the pendulum—
where the status quo is no longer acceptable.
The Article breaks new ground in Part II, concluding that the solution to
the Court’s obstructionism is corrective civil rights legislation.18 Part II explores the institutional competencies of Congress vis-à-vis the Court and federal rule-makers, and demonstrates why the former is best suited to turn the
tide toward greater court access. This Part explains why a federal statute—
rather than jurisprudential law or a Federal Rule—is the answer.
Part III asks whether this is the right time for a new civil rights act.19 This
Part assesses the propriety of such legislation through a historical lens, comparing contemporary conditions with those of previous eras when Congress
enacted corrective civil rights legislation. The Article considers two models of
restorative legislation, ranging from the sweeping Civil Rights Act of 1991 to
the targeted Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. This Part examines conditions that
catalyzed a legislative correction, including: the quantity and quality of regressive Supreme Court caselaw; dissension within the Court; and the political
landscape at the time. Each offers lessons and foreshadows whether the pursuit
of a civil rights restorative act would achieve success today.
Finally, Part IV steps into the breach, setting forth broadly what a procedural civil rights restoration act would comprise, primarily in the areas of pleadings,
class actions, and arbitration.20 This Part makes a unique contribution to the literature, identifying which precedent to overturn, which lower-court trends to
follow, which legislative models to consider, and which new voices and ideas to
elevate. The Article concludes that such restorative legislation would realign
congressional and rule-makers’ intentions, institutional competencies, and democratic values with the public dispute-resolution system.21 In calling for a procedural civil rights restoration act, this Article recognizes the harm that procedural
jurisprudence has done to civil rights enforcement, and concludes that it is time
for a new civil rights act that squarely addresses this harm.
I. PROCEDURAL LAW HAS REACHED A TIPPING POINT
The Court’s civil-procedural jurisprudence has undermined civil rights
enforcement in many troubling ways.22 The Court’s trans-substantive application of procedural rules has negatively impacted substantive civil rights over
See infra notes 282–390 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 391–542 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 543–604 and accompanying text.
21
See Resnik, supra note 8, at 87, 91–92.
22
See generally Suzette Malveaux, A Diamond in the Rough: Trans-Substantivity of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Detrimental Impact on Civil Rights, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 455 (2014)
(discussing several ways the Rules have undermined civil rights litigation).
18
19
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the last several decades.23 The pendulum has swung so far toward a restrictive
ethos that everyday Americans have difficulty effectively using the civil litigation system to protect and enforce their civil rights. Consequently, we have
reached a precipice—the point at which the status quo is no longer acceptable.
This is not to suggest that procedural anarchy exists or that it is impossible for all plaintiffs to access and use the legal system to pursue such claims.24
Indeed, plaintiffs and their counsel have adjusted and learned how to mitigate
the nature and number of obstacles. Federal judges have similarly recalibrated,
softening the blow many expected from Supreme Court precedent. It remains
true, however, that access to the civil court system has become exceedingly
difficult and illusive for civil rights litigants.
This Part illustrates how the Supreme Court’s procedural jurisprudence
has steadily eroded civil rights enforcement through statutory misinterpretation, focusing on such examples as pleadings, class-action lawsuits, and arbitration as examples.25 The Court has interpreted federal process rules and congressional statutes counter to the drafters’ intentions in the areas of pleadings,
class actions and arbitration jurisprudence, necessitating a legislative course
correction. Section A will focus on pleadings,26 Section B will focus on class
actions,27 and Section C will cover arbitration.28
A. Pleadings
With respect to pleadings, modern procedural jurisprudence has diverged
from the founding tenets of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. At the Rules’
enactment in 1938, the rule-drafters prioritized easy access to the court system
and resolution of cases on their merits29 over procedural gamesmanship.30 Pro-

23
See id. at 524–25; Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay
on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 387 (2010).
24
See generally Cyrus Mehri & Michael D. Lieder, Onward and Upward After Wal-Mart v.
Dukes, AM. ASS’N FOR JUST. TRIAL MAG., Apr. 2013, at 32, 32–37 (exploring how plaintiff attorneys
can adapt); see also Patel, supra note 17, at 2262–65 (acknowledging that litigation can still be effective).
25
See infra notes 29–281 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 29–82 and accompanying text.
27
See infra notes 83–175 and accompanying text.
28
See infra notes 176–281 and accompanying text.
29
See Charles E. Clark, History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517, 542
(1925).
30
See Miller, supra note 3, at 288; see also Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure
Rulemaking: Reflections on Experience, 60 DUKE L.J. 597, 604 (2010) (stating that the Rules were
intended to aid those with valid claims).
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cedure was subordinate to substance; process enabled the enforcement of important policies and substantive-rights.31
“Notice pleading” was the objective: pleadings simply put the parties and
the court on notice of a dispute’s parameters.32 Thus, Rule 8 required only “a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief . . . .”33 The accompanying forms at the time34 also reflected these yielding pleading requirements.35
The drafters crafted rules that emphasized equity over common law,36 and
inclusion over exclusion.37 In sync with these principles, in 1957, in racediscrimination employment case Conley v. Gibson,38 the Supreme Court established that a complaint should only be dismissed if the plaintiff could “prove
no set of facts in support of [the plaintiff’s] claim” that would grant relief.39
Consistent with the drafters’ intent, under Conley, a plaintiff could easily initiate a lawsuit, knowing that its merit would be tested after discovery pursuant
to summary judgment or trial.40 Conley governed for over a half-century until a
detour in 2007.
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly41—a consumer antitrust class action—
the Court retired Conley’s permissive “no set of facts” standard.42 Tracking
Rule 8’s language, the Court held that for a complaint to actually “show” a
plaintiff is entitled to relief, its allegations must be plausible, not just possible.43 This watershed “interpretation” effectively rewrote the rule, requiring
complaints to have greater factual support to survive dismissal than before, and
undermining the formal rule-making process.44
31
See Clark, supra note 29, at 519; Clark, supra note 12, at 297; Robert G. Bone, Securing the
Normative Foundations of Litigation Reform, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1155, 1170 (2006).
32
Clark, supra note 12, at 316.
33
FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2).
34
See FED. R. CIV. P. 84 (repealed 2015) (providing “a limited number of official forms which
may serve as guides in pleading”).
35
See Clark, supra note 12, at 316.
36
Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 922 (1987).
37
See id. at 975.
38
355 U.S. 41 (1957).
39
Id. at 45–46 (first citing Leimer v. State Mut. Life Ins. Co., 108 F.2d 302 (8th Cir. 1940); then
citing Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944); and then citing Cont’l Collieries, Inc. v.
Shober, 130 F.2d 631 (3d Cir. 1942)).
40
See Clark, supra note 12, at 318.
41
550 U.S. 544 (2007).
42
Id. at 557–63.
43
Id. at 557 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
44
See generally Lonny Hoffman, Twombly and Iqbal’s Measure: An Assessment of the Federal
Judicial Center’s Study of Motions to Dismiss, 6 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1 (2012) (analyzing and critiquing
the Federal Judicial Conference’s study of dismissal after Twombly and Iqbal). But see Steinman,
supra note 17, at 1064 (arguing that notice pleading remains viable); see also Swierkiewicz v. Sorema
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The Twombly majority expressed: (1) concern that “the threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases”;
and (2) skepticism that lower courts could effectively prevent this threat
through “careful case management” and supervision.45 Thus, the Court tasked
pleadings with solving the problem by conditioning plaintiffs’ access to discovery on stronger factual allegations at the starting line.46
This Rule 8 interpretation is unmoored from the rule-makers’ intentions
that court access be easy and decisions be merit-based.47 Moreover, Twombly
undermines Congress’s intent to facilitate robust, private enforcement of the
federal antitrust laws,48 demonstrated by the availability of treble damages and
attorney’s fees for successful plaintiffs.49
The Court later made clear in Ashcroft v. Iqbal 50—a constitutional civil
rights case against top government officials—that the new plausibility standard
applied to all civil actions, including discrimination claims.51 In 2009, in Iqbal,
the Court clarified the trans-substantive application of the new plausibility
standard, and explained how judges should determine plausibility based on
their “judicial experience and common sense.”52 The Court’s prior skepticism
of the “careful-case-management approach” to potential discovery abuse went
from skepticism to outright “rejection.”53 The Court dismissed Javid Iqbal’s
complaint—alleging constitutional violations against the Attorney General and
FBI Director following the 9/11 terrorist attacks—and granted defendants
qualified immunity.54 Although the Court conceded that the complaint’s factual
allegations, taken as true, were consistent with purposeful discrimination,55 the
N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002) (noting that Rule 8’s “simplified notice pleading standard” can only
be changed by amending the Rules); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 224 (2007) (same).
45
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559.
46
See id.
47
See Suzette M. Malveaux, Front Loading and Heavy Lifting: How Pre-Dismissal Discovery
Can Address the Detrimental Effect of Iqbal on Civil Rights Cases, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 65, 84
(2010); Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, The Supreme Court’s Regulation of Civil Procedure:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 59 UCLA L. REV. 1188, 1229–30 (2012); Adam N. Steinman, The
Pleading Problem, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1293, 1311 (2010); A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading,
49 B.C. L. REV. 431, 448–50 (2008).
48
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the “Court marche[d] resolutely” against the intent of antitrust statutes and civil procedure rules).
49
See Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12–27).
50
556 U.S. 662 (2009).
51
See id. at 684–85.
52
Id. at 679.
53
Compare Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59 (expressing uncertainty about whether case management works), with Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685 (writing off case management as a strategy).
54
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 682.
55
See id.
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Court usurped the jury’s role and concluded that the allegations did not establish a plausible claim for relief because of “more likely explanations” for defendants’ actions.56 The Court’s weighing of the relative merits of alternative
liability theories would have been inappropriate at summary judgment, let
alone at the pleading stage.57
Iqbal compromises court access for claimants alleging intentional discrimination and other causes of action involving state of mind. Such claimants
may be unable to show plausibility before discovery as the defendant has exclusive access to evidence that would enable them to overcome dismissal.58
Most would agree that Twombly and Iqbal together raised the bar for court
access.59 The Court justified this shift on the grounds that it wanted to rein in
exorbitant discovery costs60 and optimize senior government officers’ time for
official duties.61 Discovery-control and law enforcement, however, are not mutually exclusive with court access and merits-based resolutions. Moreover, no matter how laudable, the Court’s intentions cannot replace those of the rule-makers.
As with congressionally enacted statutes,62 the Court should hesitate to overturn
rule-based precedent without sufficient justification for abandoning stare decisis.63 Here, the founding rule-makers clearly spoke to the importance of opening
the civil litigation process and vindicating substantive rights. In light of this unambiguity, the Court’s pleadings jurisprudence is flawed.64
There is disagreement over how and the degree to which Twombly and
Iqbal have impacted litigation, particularly in civil rights and employmentdiscrimination cases.65 Most empirical studies have found such cases more
See id. at 681.
See, e.g., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986) (explaining that a judge’s
role at the summary judgment stage is to “determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial”).
58
See Malveaux, supra note 47, at 89–91.
59
See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Twombly and Iqbal pertain only to the factual sufficiency of a complaint, not deficiencies in the legal theory underlying a complaint. Johnson v. City of Shelby, 574 U.S.
10, 10–12 (2014) (per curiam).
60
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).
61
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685.
62
See Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989) (interpreting rules like
statutes).
63
See Mulligan et al., supra note 47, at 1233; Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm’n, 502 U.S. 197, 202
(1991) (requiring “compelling justification” to construe a statute differently); Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172–73 (1989) (preferring stability).
64
See Simona Grossi, The Claim Prism 9, 19–26 (Loy. L. Sch., Legal Stud. Rsch. Paper No.
2016-07, 2016).
65
Compare Roy L. Brooks, Critical Race Theory: A Proposed Structure and Application to Federal Pleading, 11 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 85, 107 (1994) (noting that a stricter pleading standard
harms civil rights litigants), Schneider, supra note 17, at 527–36, 556–61 (same), Alexander A.
Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 VA. L. REV. 2117, 2125–29 (2015) (detailing several negative effects of elevated pleading), Christina L. Boyd, David A. Hoffman, Zoran
Obradovic & Kosta Ristovski, Building a Taxonomy of Litigation: Clusters of Causes of Action in
56
57
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vulnerable to dismissal,66 whereas a few have not.67 Empiricists agree that
more 12(b)(6) motions have been filed and granted post-Iqbal,68 meaning that
courts are dismissing more of these cases, even if the dismissal rate has remained the same.69 They also agree that statistics generally have inherent limitations, and particular design shortcomings,70 which results in an incomplete
picture and inconclusive evidence about causation.71
The bar has shed light on the new standard’s impact. Some lawyers include more factual allegations and structure their complaints differently.72 Others have completely abandoned potentially meritorious cases.73 Those who

Federal Complaints, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 253, 254 (2013) (suggesting that Twombly and
Iqbal had a significant effect on pleading strategies), Jonah B. Gelbach, Note, Locking the Doors to
Discovery? Assessing the Effects of Twombly and Iqbal on Access to Discovery, 121 YALE L.J. 2270,
2306–07 (2012) (demonstrating a significant harmful effect on plaintiffs), Hoffman, supra note 44
(attacking the Federal Judicial Center’s finding that Twombly and Iqbal did not have a major effect on
dismissal rates), with William H.J. Hubbard, The Effects of Twombly and Iqbal, 14 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 474, 478 (2017) (arguing that there is no proof that Twombly and Iqbal have caused a
significant change in dismissals), Steinman, supra note 17, at 1058, 1064–65, 1068–70, 1078 (reconciling cases and forms with notice pleading), and Edward A. Hartnett, Taming Twombly, Even After
Iqbal, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 473, 510–16 (2010) (urging cabined interpretation of cases).
66
See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 65, at 2119–24, 2130–32, 2154–57; Joseph A. Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment Discrimination Cases, 2009 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1011; Patricia Hatamyar Moore, An Updated Quantitative Study of Iqbal’s Impact
on 12(b)(6) Motions, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 603, 605 (2012); Kendall W. Hannon, Much Ado About
Twombly? A Study on the Impact of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly on 12(b)(6) Motions, 83 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1811, 1837 (2008); Scott Dodson, A New Look: Dismissal Rates of Federal Civil
Claims, 96 JUDICATURE 127, 132 (2012); Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond Common Sense: A Social
Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 36,
39–40 (2011); Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 239–40 (2011).
67
See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 65, at 475, 479, 482, 495; JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT,
MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J. BATAILLON, FED. JUD. CTR., MOTIONS TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL 21–23 (2011); JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, MARGARET S.
WILLIAMS, JARED J. BATAILLON, ET AL., FED. JUD. CTR., UPDATE ON RESOLUTION OF RULE 12(B)(6)
MOTIONS GRANTED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND 1 (2011).
68
Hubbard, supra note 65, at 477–78, 550.
69
Suzette M. Malveaux, The Jury (or More Accurately the Judge) Is Still Out for Civil Rights and
Employment Cases Post-Iqbal, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 719, 739–40 (2013).
70
Id.
71
See Reinert, supra note 65, at 2129; Malveaux, supra note 69; David Freeman Engstrom, The
Twiqbal Puzzle and Empirical Study of Civil Procedure, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1203, 1222 (2013); Jonah
B. Gelbach, Material Facts in the Debate Over Twombly and Iqbal, 68 STAN. L. REV. 369 (2016).
72
Malveaux, supra note 69, at 743–44; see Morgan L.W. Hazelton, Procedural Postures: The
Influence of Legal Change on Strategic Litigants and Judges 125 (Aug. 2014) (Ph.D. dissertation,
Washington University in St. Louis) (finding more language in complaints post-Twombly).
73
Malveaux, supra note 69, at 743–44; see also Boyd et al., supra note 65, at 273–74 (finding
that plaintiffs plead less claims per case post-Twombly). But see Reinert, supra note 65, at 2167.
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have not changed their pleadings practice74 have, at a minimum, incurred additional costs to defend themselves from increased 12(b)(6) motions practice.75
Lower-court responses to Twombly and Iqbal have varied.76 In the cases’
immediate aftermath, district courts dismissed cases they would not have otherwise, and most federal courts of appeals affirmed such dismissals.77 Many
courts have questioned the notice pleading’s viability.78 Others have taken a
flexible, contextual approach—allowing plaintiffs to plead upon information
and belief when appropriate; liberally granting leave to amend; and permitting
parties to take limited, targeted discovery to determine plausibility ahead of a
12(b)(6) ruling79—a method some scholars recommend.80
Although assessment of the sister cases’ impact on civil rights vindication
varies, the vast majority suggests significant adversity.81 Moreover, there is no
evidence that the higher pleading hurdle has succeeded in separating the wheat
from the chaff.82
B. Class Actions
Much like with pleadings, procedural jurisprudence regarding aggregation
of claims has drifted from its core purpose in the civil rights arena. In 1938, the
class action originated in equity.83 The rule-drafters designed federal class action Rule 23, an efficiency-promoting joinder device, to provide equitable and
legal relief.84 The rule was later amended in 1966,85 inter alia, to empower the

74
See Hubbard, supra note 65, at 477–78 (finding effect on pro se plaintiffs); Reinert, supra note
65, at 2166–67 (describing potential change in litigant behavior and limited empirical evidence).
75
Malveaux, supra note 69, at 743–44; see The Supreme Court—Leading Cases: Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, 121 HARV. L. REV. 305, 314 (2007) [hereinafter Federal Jurisdiction and
Procedure].
76
Malveaux, supra note 69, at 744.
77
Id.
78
Steinman, supra note 17, at 1067 & n.67.
79
Malveaux, supra note 69, at 744–45; see also Brescia, supra note 66, at 240–41 (noting that
judges in employment and housing discrimination cases are not dismissing cases with equally plausible explanations and rarely invoking judicial “experience and common sense”).
80
See, e.g., Malveaux, supra note 47, at 106–40.
81
See Reinert, supra note 65, at 2119 & nn.10 & 11, 2120, 2129 n.59, 2130–38.
82
Id. at 2122–23, 2170–71; Alexander A. Reinert, The Supreme Court’s Civil Assault on Civil
Procedure, 41 HUM. RTS. 11, 12 (2015).
83
See Charles Alan Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 169 (1969).
84
See id.
85
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 41 F.R.D. 147, 148 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), rev’d, 391 F.2d 555 (2d
Cir. 1968).
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private bar to enforce civil rights law,86 level the playing field between parties,87 and confront segregation.88
The rewrite of the modern class action rule took place “in direct parallel
to the Civil Rights Act of 1964[,] and the race relations echo of that decade
was always in the committee room.”89 Drafters of the modern rule worked before a backdrop of fierce resistance to desegregation efforts. Although some
cases—most notably Brown v. Board of Education—provided broad remedial
class relief for systemic constitutional civil rights violations,90 others, postBrown, permitted only individualized, piecemeal relief.91 The rule-makers understood the importance of individuals using aggregation as private attorneys
general under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.92 As Professor Arthur R. Miller aptly
notes, “The Committee’s motivation, in significant part, was to create a receptive
procedural vehicle for the explosion of civil rights cases” post-Brown.93
Thus, modern Rule 23(b)(2) was born94 to facilitate a class when “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
is appropriate respecting the class as a whole . . . .”95 The Advisory Committee
Note reveals: “Illustrative are various actions in the [civil rights] field where a
party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class, usually one
whose members are incapable of specific enumeration.”96
86
See David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, Part I: Sturm und Drang, 1953–
1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 608 (2013) [hereinafter Marcus, Sturm].
87
See Benjamin Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 497, 497 (1969).
88
Suzette M. Malveaux, The Modern Class Action Rule: Its Civil Rights Roots and Relevance
Today, 66 KAN. L. REV. 325, 333, 350–51 (2017); John P. Frank, Response to 1996 Circulation of
Proposed Rule 23 on Class Actions, in 2 WORKING PAPERS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL
RULES ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO CIVIL RULE 23, at 260, 266 (1997) [hereinafter WORKING
PAPERS].
89
WORKING PAPERS, supra note 88, at 266.
90
See Maureen Carroll, Class Action Myopia, 65 DUKE L.J. 843, 857–60 (2016); David Marcus,
Flawed but Noble: Desegregation Litigation and Its Implications for the Modern Class Action, 63
FLA. L. REV. 657, 681–83 (2011) [hereinafter Marcus, Flawed]; Marcus, Sturm, supra note 86, at 601.
91
See Carroll, supra note 90, at 857–58; see also Jack B. Weinstein, Revision of Procedure:
Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFF. L. REV. 433, 468 (1960) (detailing hesitance to include
unnamed, injured individuals in civil rights class actions after a “favorable decree”).
92
See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? 50 (1991); Carroll, supra note 90, at 859–60; Marcus, Sturm, supra note 86, at 600, 608;
see Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class
Action Problem,” 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 670 n.31 (1979).
93
Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293, 294 (2014) [hereinafter Miller, Preservation].
94
Marcus, Sturm, supra note 86, at 602–06, 608; Wright, supra note 83, at 178; Carroll, supra
note 90, at 860; Marcus, Flawed, supra note 80, at 702–11.
95
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
96
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment; see id. (listing cases).
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Title VII employment-discrimination class actions in the 1960s and 1970s
typified the law-enforcement role of Rule 23(b)(2). Aggregate litigation supplemented and even supplanted federal agency regulation, which limited resources and tepid political will often hampered.97 Fueled by public interest litigation, courts certified civil rights cases impacting broad classes and providing
far-reaching relief.98 Under Rule 23(b)(2), courts regularly certified cases enjoining discriminatory policies and compensating individuals with back pay—
because of its equitable nature.99
Over time, however, the Supreme Court reined in civil rights class actions. Although recognizing that “suits alleging racial or ethnic discrimination
are often by their very nature class suits, involving classwide wrongs,” the
Court cautioned that “careful attention to the requirements of [Rule 23] remains nonetheless indispensable.”100 The Court rebuked the “across-the-board”
approach that enabled named plaintiffs alleging discrimination to represent
those challenging a broad swath of human resource practices.101 Instead, the
Court held that class representatives had to be members of the class they
sought to represent and “possess the same interest and suffer the same injury”
as class members.102 Retreat of the public interest movement and growth of
corporate political power resulted in fewer Title VII class actions operating as
vehicles for systemic change.103
Despite the rule-makers’ emphasis on the regulatory power and efficiency
of collective action, the Court has made class certification more difficult.104
The most significant example is Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes in 2011, in
which the Supreme Court raised the bar for showing commonality among litigants challenging systemic discrimination.105 “Commonality” has historically
been one of the easiest certification criteria to meet, as precedent requires only
Marcus, Sturm, supra note 86, at 639–40.
See id.
99
Id. at 640–41.
100
E. Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 405 (1977).
101
Marcus, Sturm, supra note 86, at 641–43.
102
Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 403–04 (quoting Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War,
418 U.S. 208, 216 (1974)); Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982) (quoting Rodriguez, 431 U.S. at 403).
103
Marcus, Sturm, supra note 86, at 647.
104
See Miller, Preservation, supra note 93, at 304, 321 (noting class certification as a “procedural
stop sign[]”).
105
See 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011); Malveaux, supra note 22, at 490–504; Suzette M. Malveaux,
How Goliath Won: The Future Implications of Dukes v. Wal-Mart, 106 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY
34, 39, 42–43 (2011) [hereinafter Malveaux, Goliath], https://scholarlycommons.law.
northwestern.edu/nulr_online/58/ [https://perma.cc/63NZ-FNBC]; A. Benjamin Spencer, Class Actions, Heightened Commonality, and Declining Access to Justice, 93 B.U. L. REV. 441, 463–75
(2013).
97
98
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one common question of law or fact.106 Wal-Mart, however, required plaintiffs
to demonstrate commonality with “[s]ignificant proof” that the company functioned under a broad system of discrimination.107
Moreover, the Court in Wal-Mart concluded that an employer’s “undisciplined system of subjective [decision-making]” could not bond the class.108
The all-male majority was incredulous that managers might act—even subconsciously—in a manner that systemically deprives women of equal opportunities.109 This was especially true where an employer took the unremarkable step
of putting a formal, written anti-discrimination policy in place.110 Clearly reasonable minds can—and did—differ on the issue of whether the plaintiffs’ factual allegations pointed toward systemic discrimination. Four dissenting Supreme Court Justices,111 several Ninth Circuit judges,112 and the district court
judge113 all concluded that gender discrimination could be the glue that held
the class together.
The Court also required that a question be central to the case to satisfy
commonality,114 improperly importing a predominance standard into Rule
23(b)(2).115 Additionally, the Court emphasized individual employee experience over defendant’s systemic conduct, counter to Rule 23(b)(2)’s utility as
broad civil rights avenger.116
106
See, e.g., Marisol A. ex rel. Forbes v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997) (“The commonality requirement is met if plaintiffs’ grievances share a common question of law or of fact.” (first
citing In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 818 F.2d 145, 166–67 (2d Cir. 1987); then citing Baby
Neal ex rel. Kanter v. Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 56 (3d Cir. 1994); and then citing 3B James W.M. Moore,
Allan D. Vestal & Philip B. Kurland, MOORE’S MANUAL—FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 23.06 (1996))); Kanter, 43 F.3d at 56 (“The commonality requirement will be satisfied if the named
plaintiffs share at least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.” (citing In re Agent Orange, 818 F.2d at 166–67)).
107
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355 (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 147 n.15). While only one common
question may still suffice, the nature of the question has significantly changed. See Castillo v. Bank of
Am., NA, 980 F.3d 723, 728 (9th Cir. 2020) (post-Wal-Mart, “[e]ven a single common question of
law or fact that resolves a central issue will be sufficient to satisfy this mandatory requirement for all
class actions” (citing Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359)).
108
See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 355 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 990–
91 (1988)).
109
See id. (“[L]eft to their own devices most managers in any corporation—and surely most managers in a corporation that forbids sex discrimination—would select sex-neutral, performance-based
criteria for hiring and promotion that produce no actionable disparity at all.” (emphasis added)).
110
See id. at 352–53.
111
Id. at 367, 372–73 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
112
See Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 628 (9th Cir. 2010) (Ikuta, J., dissenting),
rev’d, 564 U.S. 338 (2011).
113
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 167–68 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
114
See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 349–50.
115
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3) (requiring that common questions predominate).
116
The Court focused on the individual employee’s question—“why was I disfavored”—and
individual employee monetary relief versus class-wide injunctive relief. Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 352,
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Finally, Wal-Mart effectively reversed a half-century of Title VII jurisprudence by requiring that monetary relief be incidental to any injunctive or
declaratory relief sought in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action.117 This unanimous
ruling runs counter to the text and history of Rule 23(b)(2). The rule is silent
about whether monetary relief is permitted, much less whether it must be incidental.118 The Advisory Committee, however, conspicuously was not; its notes
state that so long as the final relief does not relate “exclusively or predominantly to money damages,” (b)(2) certification is appropriate,119 a conclusion
most appellate courts adopted.120 Back pay, in particular, was historically
granted because of its equitable nature.121 Regardless, Wal-Mart eradicated the
equity/nonequity distinction as a basis for monetary relief, instead choosing
incidentality as the lynchpin for (b)(2) certification.122 This makes it more difficult for employees challenging systemic discrimination to seek monetary relief because they now must likely use the more rigorous123 and costly Rule
23(b)(3) provision, rather than (b)(2)124—the provision particularly designed to
curb widespread discriminatory conduct.125
Many consider Wal-Mart a “dramatic shift”126 in class action jurisprudence.127 Many litigants challenging systemic discrimination have had a harder
time getting class certification.128 Employees challenging decentralized, exces360–61 (emphasis omitted); see also id. at 376 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Individual differences
should not bar a . . . Rule 23(b)(2) class . . . .” (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
623 n.19 (1997))).
117
See id. at 359–60 (unanimous opinion).
118
See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
119
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
120
Malveaux, Goliath, supra note 105, at 49 n.89 (citing cases).
121
See Dukes, 603 F.3d at 618–19, 618 n.40.
122
See Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 359–61.
123
The (b)(3) class requires common issues to predominate, and a class action to be superior. See
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
124
For (b)(2) certification, some plaintiffs forego monetary relief, forsaking a complete remedy,
risking preclusion, and undermining deterrence.
125
Mehri & Lieder, supra note 24, at 34; Michael Selmi & Sylvia Tsakos, Employment Discrimination Class Actions After Wal-Mart v. Dukes, 48 AKRON L. REV. 803, 805 (2015).
126
See Scott v. Fam. Dollar Stores, Inc., 733 F.3d 105, 119 (4th Cir. 2013) (Keenan, J., concurring); see also McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 487 (7th
Cir. 2012) (describing Wal-Mart as a “milestone”).
127
See, e.g., Carroll, supra note 90, at 889; John M. Husband & Bradford J. Williams, Wal-Mart
v. Dukes Redux: The Future of the Sprawling Class Action, 40 COLO. LAW. 53, 59 (2011) (calling
Wal-Mart a “watershed case”).
128
See R. Paul Yetter, Christian J. Ward & Dori Kornfeld Goldman, The Impact of Wal-Mart v.
Dukes on Employment Law Class Actions and FLSA Collective Actions 4 (Oct. 2013) (unpublished
manuscript), http://www.yettercoleman.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/The-Impact-of-Wal-Martv.-Dukes-on-Employment-Law-Class-Actions-and-FLSA-Collective-Actions.pdf [https://perma.cc/
PY25-G8P4] (citing early denials of certification or decertifications post-Wal-Mart). But see Selmi,
supra note 125, at 804–05, 829–30 (stating that courts distinguish Wal-Mart based on its national
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sive, discretionary decision-making by local managers as a discriminatory policy now lack commonality.129
Granted, Wal-Mart has not precluded class actions involving discretionary
practices altogether.130 Where local managers exercise discretion pursuant to a
company-wide policy131 or upper-level managers are the ones who exercise the
discretion,132 commonality may be satisfied.133 Moreover plaintiffs have mitigated Wal-Mart’s impact by: employing regional and subclasses,134 distinguishing Wal-Mart,135 challenging employment practices under statutes other

scope, merits and jurisdiction, resulting in less impact on employment discrimination cases than anticipated); David Marcus, The Persistence and Uncertain Future of the Public Interest Class Action, 24
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 395, 407, 409–10, 412, 415–16, 426 (2020) (stating that unlike Wal-Mart,
cases seeking solely injunctive relief solely against government defendants usually not impacted).
129
See, e.g., Davis v. Cintas Corp., 717 F.3d 476, 481 (6th Cir. 2013); Tabor v. Hilti, Inc., 703
F.3d 1206, 1206 (10th Cir. 2013); Bolden v. Walsh Constr. Co., 688 F.3d 893, 894–98 (7th Cir.
2012); Bennett v. Nucor Corp., 656 F.3d 802, 814–15 (8th Cir. 2011); Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp.,
270 F.R.D. 186, 188–90 (D.N.J. 2010); see also Scott, 733 F.3d at 110 (affirming the district court’s
denial of commonality). Courts have applied the same reasoning to discretionary lending practices
under the Fair Housing Act, Equal Credit Opportunity Act, and § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of
1991. See Malveaux, supra note 22, at 495–96, 496 n.253 (citing cases); Rodriguez v. Nat’l City
Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2013).
130
See Selmi, supra note 125, at 822–29 (discussing McReynolds and Scott); Scott, 733 F.3d at
113; Andrew J. Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Actions and Legal Strategy, CATO SUP. CT. REV.,
2010–2011, at 319, 355 (noting that class actions are “not doomed,” but that the certification game is
“a little fiercer”).
131
See Chi. Tchrs. Union, Loc. No. 1 v. Bd. of Educ., 797 F.3d 426, 437–38 (7th Cir. 2015);
McReynolds, 672 F.3d at 488–90; In re Johnson, 760 F.3d 66, 73 (D.C. Cir. 2014); DL v. District of
Columbia, 713 F.3d 120, 126, 128 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 877
F. Supp. 2d 113, 117–18 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 285 F.R.D. 492, 509,
511–12 (N.D. Cal. 2012); Floyd v. City of New York, 283 F.R.D. 153, 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (stating
that the stop-and-frisk program was a centralized policy).
132
Woods-Early v. Corning Inc., 330 F.R.D. 117, 124 (W.D.N.Y. 2019); see Scott, 733 F.3d at
114; Chi. Tchrs. Union, 797 F.3d at 438.
133
See Chi. Tchrs. Union, 797 F.3d at 437–38; Scott, 733 F.3d at 114, 116–17; In re Countrywide
Fin. Corp. Mortg. Lending Pracs. Litig., 708 F.3d 704, 707–10 (6th Cir. 2013). Even so, companies
may escape liability by failing to enact a companywide policy, thereby decoupling supervisor misconduct from the company. See, e.g., Bennett, 656 F.3d at 814–15.
134
Mehri & Lieder, supra note 24, at 35, 36; see, e.g., Calloway v. Caraco Pharm. Lab’ys, Ltd.,
287 F.R.D. 402, 406 (E.D. Mich. 2012) (subclasses); Ellis, 285 F.R.D. at 496, 509 (certifying class
that was a “mere fraction” of Wal-Mart’s class).
135
Compare Cerjanec v. FCA U.S., LLC, No. 17-10619, 2018 WL 3729063, at *9 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 6, 2018) (distinguishing Wal-Mart and analogizing to McReynolds), with Schonton v. MPA
Granada Highlands LLC, No. 16-cv-12151, 2019 U.S. WL 1455197, at *6 (D. Mass. Apr. 2, 2019)
(distinguishing Wal-Mart as “unavailing”).
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than Title VII,136 and initiating actions in state courts—with varying degrees of
success.137 The net result, however, has been a higher bar for collective action.
Indeed, the Court has rejected many of Wal-Mart’s offspring as untimely
or as suffering the same defects as their parent. In China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh,
the Supreme Court unanimously disallowed putative class members, upon denial of class certification, to file a new class action after the statute of limitations had expired.138 The Court prohibited equitable tolling on judicial efficiency grounds, concluding that “stacked” class actions would enable “limitless” filings.139 Thus, Wal-Mart plaintiffs could not try again; their cases were
dismissed as impermissible stacked class actions.
As for civil rights claimants seeking monetary remedies, although 23(b)(3)
is more arduous,140 it has not proved insurmountable.141 For example, bifurcation of class-wide injunctive and individual monetary relief, coupled with Rule
23(c)(4) issue certification142—although controversial143—has satisfied predominance.144 The cost of Rule 23(b)(3) individualized notice, however, has
chilled some employees from bringing meritorious cases altogether.145
Notably, the Court’s obstructionist class action jurisprudence has not been
absolute, therein making procedural obstructionism harder to see and address.146 For example, in 2016, in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,147 the Su136
See Yetter et al., supra note 128, at 13–19 (holding that Rule 23 certification not applicable to
FLSA and state wage and hour collective actions).
137
Malveaux, supra note 22, at 499; see Yetter et al., supra note 128, at 9–11 (describing plaintiff
strategies post-Wal-Mart); see, e.g., Selmi, supra note 125, at 829–30 (rejecting regional class actions
post-Wal-Mart).
138
138 S. Ct. 1800, 1804 (2018).
139
See Ronald Mann, Opinion Analysis: Justices Limit Tolling of Statutes of Limitations That
Permits “Stacked” Class Actions, SCOTUSBLOG (June 11, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/
06/opinion-analysis-justices-limit-tolling-of-statutes-of-limitations-that-permits-stacked-class-actions/
[https://perma.cc/UY3A-Y9VN].
140
Mehri & Lieder, supra note 24, at 34, 36–37; see, e.g., Parko v. Shell Oil Co., 739 F.3d 1083,
1085–87 (7th Cir. 2014) (reversing class certification and applying rigorous criteria to satisfy Rule
23(b)(3) predominance).
141
Mehri & Lieder, supra note 24, at 36–37.
142
See, e.g., Chen-Oster v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., No. 10 Civ. 6950, 2015 WL 1566722, at *15
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 10, 2015).
143
Jenna G. Farleigh, Note, Splitting the Baby: Standardizing Issue Class Certification, 64
VAND. L. REV. 1585, 1595–1603 (2011) (describing different circuit courts’ approaches).
144
See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 489–92 (7th
Cir. 2012); In re Johnson, 760 F.3d 66, 74–75 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

145
STEPHEN B. BURBANK & SEAN FARHANG, RIGHTS AND RETRENCHMENT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION
AGAINST FEDERAL LITIGATION 67, 75 (2017).

146
Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: Group Lawsuits Get a (Modest?) Boost, SCOTUSBLOG
(Mar. 22, 2016), https://www.scotusblog.com/2016/03/opinion-analysis-group-lawsuits-get-a-modestboost/ [https://perma.cc/84TQ-6WB8]; Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Rules for Class Action Plaintiffs,
LAW.COM, https://www.law.com/2016/01/20/supreme-court-rules-for-class-action-plaintiffs/?slreturn
=20210729123400 [https://perma.cc/SSG6-ZGXU] (Jan. 20, 2016).
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preme Court upheld a Rule 23(b)(3) class and collective action where workers
relied on a representative sample to establish class-wide liability under the Fair
Labor Standards Act of 1938 (“FLSA”) and state wage law148—a move disappointing to business interests.149
In 2016, in Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,150 the Supreme Court also
held that where a plaintiff did not accept a settlement offer or Rule 68 offer of
judgment, neither the plaintiff’s claims nor those of the putative class were
mooted.151 Campbell-Ewald thwarts the strategy of corporate defendants defeating putative class actions by mooting a putative representative’s claim.152
The Court did not decide whether the same result would occur “if a defendant
deposits the full amount of the plaintiff’s individual claim in an account payable to the plaintiff, and the court then enters judgment for the plaintiff in that
amount.”153 But most circuit courts have concluded that this hinges on whether
there is a putative class action, in which case tendering complete relief to an
individual named plaintiff is unlikely to moot class claims.154
In 2021, however, in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,155 the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the standing doctrine denied court access to class members
alleging a Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”) violation.156 Despite Congress’s creation of statutory rights for a violation alone, the Court concluded
136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
See id. at 1046.
149
See Kristin Linsley Myles & David J. Feder, In “Tyson,” SCOTUS Sketches New Test for
“Trial by Formula,” LAW.COM: THE RECORDER, https://www.law.com/therecorder/almID/12027537
06113/in-tyson-scotus-sketches-new-test-for-trial-by-formula/?slreturn=20200712173624 [https://
perma.cc/XJW3-LQ42] (Mar. 30, 2016); Jess Bravin, Supreme Court Upholds Employee Class Action
Against Tyson Foods, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/supreme-court-upholds-employeeclass-action-against-tyson-foods-1458657604 [https://perma.cc/K7YJ-7NUM] (Mar. 22, 2016).
150
136 S. Ct. 663 (2016).
151
See id. at 666–74.
152
Ross Todd, Campbell-Ewald: Defense Lawyers Say Clients Still Have Options, CLASS ACTION REP. (Beard Grp., Inc., Philadelphia, Pa.), Feb. 3, 2016; David Carpenter & Micah Moon, In the
Beginning There Was Genesis, but Campbell Made It Moot, LAW.COM: CORP. COUNS., https://www.
law.com/corpcounsel/almID/1202750534206/In-the-Beginning-There-Was-Genesis-but-CampbellMade-It-Moot/ [https://perma.cc/Z79X-94MD] (Feb. 24, 2016).
153
Campbell-Ewald, 136 S. Ct. at 671–74; see Todd, supra note 152 (describing Campbell-Ewald
as “narrow” (quoting Eric Troutman)).
154
See Kuntze v. Josh Enters., Inc., 365 F. Supp. 3d 630, 640–41 (E.D. Va. 2019) (describing this
circuit split). Compare Justiciability—Class Action Mootness—Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 130
HARV. L. REV. 427, 432 (2016) (stating that the individual named plaintiff’s case would be moot), and
THOMAS D. ROWE, JR., 13 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 68.04 (2018) (stating that where there is only
one individual claim, an unconditional deposit moots a case), with Katrina Christakis, Jeff Pilgrim &
James Morrissey, “So You’re Telling Me There’s a Chance!”: The Post-Campbell-Ewald Possibility of
Mooting a Class Action by “Tender” of Complete Relief, 71 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 237, 253 (2017)
(noting that few defendants have mooted individual and class claims by tendering complete relief).
155
141 S. Ct. 2190 (2021).
156
Id. at 2200, 2208–09.
147
148
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that Article III standing was not satisfied when an individual class member’s
injury lacked a “close historical or common-law analogue” to the FCRA.157
Although TransUnion left open the question of whether each class member must evince standing prior to class certification,158 the Court’s reliance on
the standing doctrine may forecast the next obstructionist frontier.159 In a dissent by Justices Kagan, Breyer and Sotomayor, and an unexpected one by Justice Thomas, the Justices balked at the majority’s use of the Constitution to bar
court access where Congress has explicitly created a private right of action.160
Lower-court aggregation law is also in flux in disconcerting ways.161 For
example, the circuit courts are split on the standard courts should use to ascertain members of a class (“ascertainability”) at the class certification stage.162
Some jurisdictions have elevated this court-made threshold—historically requiring only that a class be defined using objective criteria.163 Some courts
now require evidentiary proof of an administratively feasible method for determining class membership from the outset, regardless of whether such rigor
comports with the text and purpose of Rule 23 or sound policy.164 This has led
some scholars to conclude that heightened ascertainability “will lead to almost

Id. at 2204.
Id. at 2208 n.4. Thus, the viability of the “no injury” class actions issue has been staved off.
159
See Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Court Limits Standing in Credit-Reporting Lawsuit, SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2021), https://www.scotusblog.com/2021/06/court-limits-standing-in-creditreporting-lawsuit/ [https://perma.cc/VLN2-4LHS]; Matthew M. Petersen, Douglas A. Thompson &
Christopher J. Schmidt, TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez: The Supreme Court Further Narrows Article III
Standing and Rejects “No Injury” Class Actions, BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER (June 29, 2021),
https://www.bclplaw.com/en-US/insights/transunion-v-ramirez-the-supreme-court-further-narrowsarticle-iii-standing.html [https://perma.cc/KS4Z-46P2] (stating that TransUnion “is a significant blow
to consumer plaintiffs,” “unquestionably raises the bar,” and “significantly ups the ante”).
160
See TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2225 (Kagan, J., dissenting); id. at 2217–18, 2221 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
161
A comprehensive discussion of these is beyond the scope of this paper.
162
See, e.g., Heather Swadley, Comment, Class Dismissed: The Dangers of Applying Ascertainability Requirements to Rule 23(b)(2) Class Actions, 93 TEMP. L. REV. 395, 396, 410 nn.190 & 192
(2021) (describing circuit split); Kyle Harris Timmons, Comment, The End of Low-Value Consumer
Class Action Lawsuits?: The Federal Circuit Split on the Ascertainability Requirement for Class Certification, 68 MERCER L. REV. 1107, 1119–1134, 1119 n.192 (2017) (same); see also Kristin MacDonnell, Is It Time for the End of Typicality?, 5 J.L. 17, 19–20 (2015) (describing lack of consensus
and confusion).
163
Swadley, supra note 162, at 396, 401–04, 410–17 (disapproving of the more rigorous standard
for Rule 23(b)(2) classes).
164
Id.; Timmons, supra note 162, at 1144 (demonstrating that heightened ascertainability “reduces
corporate accountability, lessens oversight and protection . . . and incentivizes poor record keeping”).
157
158
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certain death for some civil rights class actions,”165 an issue the Court has declined to address.166
Another circuit split exists over the use of Rule 23(c)(4) issue certification under Rule 23(b)(3). A majority of circuits permits certifying a class action to resolve a particular issue by siphoning the issue off from the rest of the
case being considered for 23(b)(3) certification.167 Supporters tout its efficiency168 and capacity to advance materially the litigation,169 especially where a
systemic discrimination question exists. A minority of circuits, however, contends this strategy evades Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement that common issues
predominate over individual ones and that the case as a whole satisfies predominance.170 Critics see it as an end-run171 and constitutional quagmire.172
The Court has yet to resolve this debate.
Lower courts and commentators also disagree over the appropriate rigor
of Rule 23(a)(3) typicality. Some support a high bar.173 Others treat it the same

165
Swadley, supra note 162, at 415; see also Rhonda Wasserman, Ascertainability: Prose, Policy, and Process, 50 CONN. L. REV. 695, 721 (2018) (detailing the harm to plaintiffs).
166
See Mullins v. Direct Digit., LLC, 795 F.3d 654 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1161
(2016); Rikos v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 799 F.3d 497 (6th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1493
(2016); Briseno v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 844 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 313 (2017).
167
See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008); see Farleigh,
supra note 143, at 1601 (describing this circuit split).
168
See, e.g., Mejdrech v. Met-Coil Sys. Corp., 319 F.3d 910, 911 (7th Cir. 2003); McReynolds v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 672 F.3d 482, 492 (7th Cir. 2012); Jon Romberg, Half a
Loaf Is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification of Particular Issues Under Rule
23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH. L. REV. 249, 299, 334.
169
McLaughlin, 522 F.3d at 234; PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION § 2.02
cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2010); see also Farleigh, supra note 143, at 1630 (proposing a multi-factor test);
Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class Action, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 149, 238–40 (2003) (approving of issue class certification that splits liability from monetary
relief).
170
See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 & n.21 (5th Cir. 1996); In re RhonePoulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1995).
171
Laura J. Hines, Challenging the Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. 709, 711–12,
749–52 (2003) (advocating a strict approach); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Daniel Wolf, Class Certification:
Trends and Developments Over the Last Five Years (2004–2009), in THE 13TH ANNUAL NATIONAL
INSTITUTE ON CLASS ACTIONS, at F-1, F-50 to -52 (Am. Bar Ass’n ed., 2009).
172
See Castano, 84 F.3d at 747, 750 (holding that the Seventh Amendment Reexamination
Clause was violated); Rhone-Poulenc, 51 F.3d at 1303 (same); Farleigh, supra note 143, at 1602 (noting that issue class certification is “uniquely plagued by Reexamination Clause concerns”). But see
Tobias Barrington Wolff, Preclusion in Class Action Litigation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 717, 736 (2005)
(finding that the Reexamination Clause is not a bar); Patrick Woolley, Mass Tort Litigation and the
Seventh Amendment Reexamination Clause, 83 IOWA L. REV. 499, 500 (1998) (same); Melissa Hart,
Will Employment Discrimination Class Actions Survive?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 813, 832 (2004) (same).
173
See, e.g., Treviso v. Nat’l Football Museum, Inc., No. 17CV472, 2018 WL 4608197, at *3
(N.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2018) (citing Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 537–38 (6th
Cir. 2012)).
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as commonality, adequacy, and ascertainability.174 Still others seek to eradicate
it altogether, concluding it has no independent justification post-Wal-Mart.175
This issue, like others, is ripe for Court resolution.
In sum, the landscape for modern civil rights class actions is complex and
riddled with significant obstacles to systemic discrimination claims that warrant a legislative intervention.
C. Arbitration
The Court has also interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) detached from the drafters’ intent. In 1925, Congress sought to provide an inexpensive, fast, and efficient procedural alternative for merchants of equal bargaining power to regularly and voluntarily resolve disputes in federal court.176
Over the last several decades, however, the Court has expanded the power of
this alternative forum and of pre-dispute, private arbitration contracts far beyond Congress’s intent.
The Court has broadened whom the FAA covers.177 The coverage is not only businesses, but also individuals who have contracted with employers, large
service providers, and powerful financial institutions.178 Today, one can find a
pre-dispute, compulsory arbitration agreement with everyday people in all manners of contract.179 For example, the FAA’s drafters emphasized in the legislative
history their intent to exempt a broad swath of workers from the statute.180 In
2001, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, however, the Supreme Court held that
the Act’s exemption clause covered only transportation workers,181 thereby exposing the vast majority of employees and employment contracts to arbitration.182 Justice Stevens concluded that the majority failed to consider properly
Congress’s will, “misuse[d] its authority”183 and “skew[ed] its interpretation with

174
See MacDonnell, supra note 162, at 30–31; see, e.g., Skipper v. Giant Food Inc., 68 F. App’x
393, 397 (4th Cir. 2003).
175
See, e.g., MacDonnell, supra note 162, at 19, 27, 30–31, 37–38.
176
Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal
Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 102–03, 106, 108 (2006)
[hereinafter Moses, Misconstruction].
177
See id. at 102, 106.
178
See id. at 112–13.
179
See id.
180
See id. at 105–06; Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 124–30 (2001) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), ch. 392, 61 stat. 669 (1947) (codified at 9
U.S.C. § 1) (exempting certain professions from the Act).
181
Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 109–11, 113–19 (majority opinion).
182
But see New Prime Inc. v. Oliveira, 139 S. Ct. 532, 543–44 (2019) (holding that the agreement
fell within the exemption).
183
Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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its own policy preferences.”184 This statutory “misconstruction”185 of the FAA
has resulted in the compulsion of employees without bargaining power being
compelled to waive court access as a condition of employment.186
The Court has broadened how FAA coverage works. Despite the drafters’
emphasis on voluntariness,187 the Court has enforced adhesion contracts and
arbitration agreements made without knowledge and consent.188 For example,
in Circuit City, the Court permitted a job application that conditioned employment on the applicant’s agreement to arbitrate all claims, including civil rights
ones.189 Some of the Court’s major justifications for its liberal enforcement of
arbitration agreements have been to protect litigant choice and the freedom to
contract.190 The Court’s jurisprudence perpetuates this myth of mutual consent
and masks an ever-growing problem—misuse of the arbitral forum as a safe haven for misconduct.191 In reality, many “agreements” are take-it-or-leave-it arrangements involving little understanding, unequal power, and no negotiation.192
The Court has greatly expanded what the FAA covers. The forum’s scope
has evolved beyond simple disputes arising out of normal business transactions193 to statutory and constitutional claims not originally contemplated.194
Id. at 133.
Moses, Misconstruction, supra note 176, at 146–49 (noting that the textual interpretation was
misguided); Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (accusing the Court of “reason[ing] in
a vacuum”); id. at 138.
186
See Moses, Misconstruction, supra note 176, at 146–52.
187
See Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L.
REV. 265, 279 (1926); Moses, Misconstruction, supra note 176, at 106–08, 110–11 (noting that the
FAA “was not intended to permit a party with greater economic strength to compel a weaker party to
arbitrate”); Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010) (emphasizing that
arbitration requires “consent, not coercion” (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989))).
188
See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995).
189
Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 109–10 (majority opinion). See generally Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (holding that an Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
claim falls under the FAA).
190
See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., 489 U.S. at 474, 478 (explaining the Federal Arbitration Act’s goal
of “enforc[ing] agreements into which parties had entered” and putting arbitration agreements “upon
the same footing as other contracts”) (internal citation omitted) (first quoting Dean Witter Reynolds
Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985); and then quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
511 (1974)).
191
See, e.g., Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 109–10, 121; Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S.
228, 231 (2013).
192
See generally William M. Howard, Validity of Arbitration Clause Precluding Class Actions,
13 A.L.R.6th 145 (2006).
193
See Moses, Misconstruction, supra note 176, at 112.
194
See id. at 144 (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO), ADEA, and Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA) claims, among others (first citing Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v.
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241–42 (1987); then citing Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20; and then citing Vimar
Seguros y Reaseguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995))); Cohen & Dayton, supra note
187, at 281; Moses, Misconstruction, supra note 176, at 111; see, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
184
185
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For example, civil rights claims include allegations of employment discrimination and sexual harassment under Title VII, disability discrimination under the
Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), wage theft under the FLSA, and maternity and medical leave denials under the Family and Medical Leave Act.195
The Court has expanded where the FAA applies. Although Congress intended the Act to apply solely to federal courts,196 the Court has held that the
FAA applies to states.197 It also preempts contrary state law.198 In 2011, in
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,199 the Supreme Court held that the FAA
preempted California’s judicial rule classifying certain class arbitration bans as
unconscionable.200 The Court reinforced state obedience in DIRECTV, Inc. v.
Imburgia in 2015,201 again holding the FAA preempted California law.202
The Court’s jurisprudence has gone beyond why the FAA was enacted.
Although the law was designed to merely level the playing field between arbitration agreements and other contracts, the former receives favor.203 The
Court’s unwavering deference to such agreements’ enforceability has been
steadfast. Arbitrators enjoy heightened deference and no meaningful appellate
review.204 The Court has asserted “a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration
agreements”205 not rooted in the Act206 and more ambitious than envisioned,207
as Justice Stevens observed in his Circuit City dissent over twenty years ago.208
For example, the Court has gone so far as to enforce an arbitration agreement even when plaintiffs would be unable to vindicate their substantive rights

Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 624–25 (1985) (antitrust claims); Gilmer, 500 U.S. at
27–28 (ADEA).
195
ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION 1 (2017).
196
See Moses, Misconstruction, supra note 176, at 112.
197
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 12 (1984).
198
Id.; Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 688 (1996). See generally Southland Corp.
v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (FAA applies to state courts); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson,
513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995) (confirming Southland). See Kristen M. Blankley, Standing on Its Own
Shoulders: The Supreme Court’s Statutory Interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act, 55 AKRON L.
REV. 101, 136–37 (2022) for an analysis of the Court’s FAA preemption jurisprudence.
199
563 U.S. 333 (2011).
200
Id. at 336–43, 351–52.
201
136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
202
See id. at 465.
203
See Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 110–11 (2001); id. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204
See, e.g., DIRECTV, 136 S. Ct. at 465; see also Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales,
Inc., 139 S. Ct. 524, 531 (2019) (noting that arbitrators determine the question of arbitrability).
205
Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (emphasis added).
206
See Moses, Misconstruction, supra note 176, at 123.
207
See id. at 123–24.
208
Cir. City, 532 U.S. at 131–32 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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because of the agreement’s embedded class action ban.209 In 2013, in American
Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Supreme Court heard a case by a
group of retailers that accused American Express of using its monopoly power
to violate federal antitrust law.210 The cost of an expert analysis necessary to
prove the retailers’ claims eclipsed each individual’s potential recovery, some
by ten times, thereby necessitating cost-sharing.211 The only viable way to proceed was collectively, which plaintiffs’ arbitration agreement prohibited.212
The Court concluded that even if a putative class proves that it would be
impossible or irrational to pursue its individual cases, an arbitration agreement
prohibiting collective action is enforceable under the FAA.213 Consequently,
large corporate defendants like Amex can effectively immunize themselves
from liability where plaintiffs have little money or negative value claims.
Thus, the class arbitration ban functioned as an exculpatory clause.
Italian Colors elevates form over substance to a height unbound, and severely narrows the effective vindication rule, which states: arbitration is permissible “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum . . . .”214 The rule’s purpose is “to prevent arbitration clauses from choking off a plaintiff’s ability to enforce congressionally created rights.”215 But Italian Colors concludes that so long as an
arbitration agreement allows a plaintiff to assert a substantive right, it does not
matter if the terms make it impossible to actually vindicate that right.216
Italian Colors would extend to employment and consumer cases that often
cannot be brought individually because of the substantial resources required,
thereby necessitating collective action or cost sharing. Italian Colors protects
arbitration agreements that lack, if not outright prohibit, such solutions.
Italian Colors is just one of many allowing class-arbitration bans under
the FAA.217 More recently, the Court has concluded that the National Labor
Relations Act (“NLRA”) also allows class-arbitration bans in employment contracts.218 In 2018, in Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis, the Court held that although
the statute protects a worker’s right to “engage in . . . concerted activities for

See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 231 (2013).
Id.
211
Id.
212
See id.
213
Id. at 233–35.
214
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985).
215
Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 240 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
216
See id. at 236–37.
217
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337–43, 351–52 (2011); DIRECTV,
Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 463 (2015).
218
See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1612 (2018).
209
210

2022]

A New Civil Rights Act

2429

the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection,”219 this
does not include class actions.220 Thus, workers will find no safety in the
NLRA from being required to arbitrate alone.
In sum, the architects of the FAA would be amazed to fathom the Court’s
unbridled favoritism toward arbitration. Procedural law has become untethered
from Congress’s goal of encouraging recalcitrant courts to consider properly
voluntary arbitration agreements between corporate players in the commercial
context. The Court’s jurisprudence has swung far from the legislature’s original intent, “building . . . case by case, an edifice of its own creation,” as Justice
O’Connor observed over three decades ago.221 The Court’s jurisprudence has
been insular and self-referential, creating a canon that enforces arbitration
agreements at nearly any cost.222
Workers and others challenging systemic discriminatory policies and unfair practices are paying the price.223 Mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment contracts have proliferated over the last three decades.224
A 2017 study found that over fifty-six percent of all private-sector, nonunion
employees (over sixty million American workers) are subjected to mandatory

See 29 U.S.C. § 157.
See 138 S. Ct. at 1612.
221
Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring);
id. (noting that “all pretense of ascertaining congressional intent” of the FAA is gone); see Cir. City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court is standing on
its own shoulders . . . .”); see also Blankley, supra note 198, at 102–03 (“[A]rbitration jurisprudence is
insular . . . .”); Deepak Gupta, Symposium: For Decades, Court Has Built “An Edifice of Its Own
Creation” in Arbitration Cases—It’s Time to Tear It Down and Rebuild, SCOTUSBLOG (May 24,
2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/05/symposium-for-decades-court-has-built-an-edifice-of-itsown-creation-in-arbitration-cases-its-time-to-tear-it-down-and-rebuild/ [https://perma.cc/WX4N-B598]
(explaining that the Supreme Court is not trying to follow congressional intent).
222
See Blankley, supra note 198, at 134–35, 150. Justices even rely on interpretive tools that
counter their judicial philosophies to achieve this outcome. Id. at 102–03.
223
In the consumer context, eighty-one percent of Fortune 100 companies impose mandatory
arbitration. Imre Stephen Szalai, The Prevalence of Consumer Arbitration Agreements by America’s
Top Companies, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 233, 234, 254 (2019), https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.
edu/online/vol52/52-online-Szalai.pdf [https://perma.cc/KY92-KD68].
224
See COLVIN, supra note 195; see also Katherine V.W. Stone & Alexander J.S. Colvin, The
Arbitration Epidemic: Mandatory Arbitration Deprives Workers and Consumers of Their Rights 15–
16 (Econ. Pol’y Inst., Briefing Paper No. 414, 2015) (stating that arbitration in the employment context has increased significantly); Christine M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in
Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CALIF.
L. REV. 1203, 1208 (2002) (same). This trend has taken off since Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991). Blankley, supra note 198, at 151 (stating that the court’s goals are expanding arbitration and contracting aggregation); see EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 296 n.11
(2002) (discussing the proliferation of arbitration agreements).
219
220
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arbitration225—with the greatest impact on industries disproportionately comprised of low-wage workers, women, and African-Americans.226
A 2015 study found that although arbitration cases move faster, they enjoy far less success: “Employee win rates in mandatory arbitration are much
lower than in either federal court or state court . . . . Differences in damages
awarded are even greater . . . .”227 The study concludes that “mandatory arbitration is massively less favorable to employees than are the courts.”228 Although the success rate gap has decreased, the employee win rate was still
35.7% lower in arbitration than adjudication.229 Other studies put employee
win rates in arbitration even lower.230 For those employees who prevailed in
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”)231 arbitrations, their awards were
far less than those who litigated.232 Employees in mandatory arbitration also
have more difficulty retaining counsel.233
In addition to the quantitative evidence, qualitative data paints a bleak
picture of arbitral outcomes. The New York Times uncovered numerous casualties in a study of 25,000 arbitrations between 2010 and 2014, and in interviews
of hundreds of plaintiffs, attorneys, arbitrators, and judges.234 Employees chal225
See COLVIN, supra note 195. Approximately fifty-four percent of nonunion, private-sector
employers require arbitration. For employers with more than one thousand employees, sixty-five percent require the same. Id.
226
See Stephanie Bornstein, When Forum Determines Rights: Forced Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, in A GUIDE TO CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 15, at 368, 374; see, e.g., Rebecca N. Morrow, Taxing Employers for Imposing Mandatory Arbitration, Class Action Waiver, and Nondisclosure
of Dispute Provisions, 74 SMU L. REV. 59, 81–82 (2021).
227
Stone & Colvin, supra note 224, at 19; see also Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees:
How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection,
80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1322–27 (2015) (supporting the argument that plaintiffs do worse in arbitration than in court).
228
Stone & Colvin, supra note 224, at 19.
229
See id.; see also Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C. L. REV.
679, 688 (2018) (“[I]t is striking how discouraging the more recent data are.”).
230
See, e.g., Alexander J.S. Colvin & Mark D. Gough, Individual Employment Rights Arbitration
in the United States: Actors and Outcomes, 68 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 1019, 1028 (2015) (finding
that the employee win-rate in AAA arbitrations was nineteen percent); Samuel Estreicher, Michael
Heise & David S. Sherwyn, Evaluating Employment Arbitration: A Call for Better Empirical Research, 70 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 375, 383 (2018) (finding that the employee win-rate was twenty-two
percent).
231
The AAA accounts for roughly half of employment arbitration agreements. ALEXANDER J.S.
COLVIN & MARK D. GOUGH, COMPARING MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND LITIGATION: ACCESS,
PROCESS, AND OUTCOMES 34 (2014).
232
See Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 80 (2014) (noting that the median arbitration award was $36,500,
whereas the median litigation award was $150,500 for federal discrimination cases).
233
Stone & Colvin, supra note 224, at 21–22 (illustrating that plaintiffs’ counsel accepted half as
many cases involving employees with mandatory arbitration agreements).
234
See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a “Privatization of the Justice System,” N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-
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lenging discrimination have also testified before Congress about the myriad
ways in which the arbitral forum has personally failed them.235
Class action bans in agreements in particular have taken a toll on everyday Americans. As Justice Ginsburg noted in her DIRECTV dissent: “It has
become routine, in a large part due to this Court’s decisions, for powerful economic enterprises to write into their form contracts with consumers and employees no-class-action arbitration clauses.”236 For example, for private-sector,
non-union employees beholden to mandatory arbitration, forty-one percent are
subject to class arbitration bans237—accounting for almost a quarter of American private-sector, nonunion workers.238 Moreover, for the eighty-one Fortune100 companies requiring arbitration in their consumer contracts, almost all of
them forbid class actions.239 The Court has disallowed class arbitration where a
contract prohibits, is ambiguous about,240 or is silent regarding class actions.241
Justice Ginsburg warned that the confluence of DIRECTV, Concepcion, and
Italian Colors has deprived consumers the ability to seek recourse for losses,
therein shielding influential economic interests from responsibility for contravention of consumer-protection laws.242
The same is true for civil rights, where the marriage between compulsory
arbitration and the class action ban is particularly insidious.243 Emboldened by
the pendulum’s fixed pro-arbitration jurisprudence, companies have strategically stripped workers—particularly low-wage ones—of their ability to act
collectively to challenge company-wide discriminatory policies.244 Class arbi-

arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html [https://perma.cc/2K4X-59SE]; Jessica SilverGreenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stackingthe-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/L379-KKNR].
235
See, e.g., Arbitration: Is It Fair When Forced?: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
112th Cong. 119 (2011) (statement of Dr. Deborah Pierce, Associate Director of Emergency Medicine).
236
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 471 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
237
COLVIN, supra note 195.
238
See id. For private-sector, nonunion employers that require arbitration, thirty percent prohibit
class actions. See id.
239
Szalai, supra note 223, at 238, 254.
240
See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 (2019).
241
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010) (finding that silence
is not consent). Some courts interpret silence on this matter as an outright prohibition. Szalai, supra
note 223, 238 & n.11.
242
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 477 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see Blankley,
supra note 198, at 154 (explaining that FAA jurisprudence has “largely expanded the powers of arbitrators and favored business interests” over the last forty years).
243
See Malveaux, supra note 22, at 506; Miller, Preservation, supra note 93, at 323, 324 nn.140–
41; Sternlight, supra note 227, at 1311.
244
See Stone & Colvin, supra note 224, at 15.
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tration bans are largely enforced,245 leaving individual employees with no
choice but to pursue relief on their own in arbitration—often a more difficult
option.246 Consequently, there are strikingly few individual arbitration cases,247
resulting in misconduct often going unchallenged.248 As Judge Posner famously quipped, “only a lunatic or a fanatic sues for [thirty dollars].”249
This conventional wisdom, however, is being challenged. Thousands of
workers—primarily independent contractors in the gig economy—have alleged
misclassification, wage theft (through denial of minimum wage and overtime)
and other labor law violations against Uber, Lyft, DoorDash, and others.250 In
response, such companies have instinctively and successfully filed motions to
compel individual arbitration based on mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration
agreements and class action bans.251 Surprisingly, these companies now face a
245
Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 234 (noting that the New York Times’ study of federal cases filed between 2010 and 2014 reveals “[i]n 2014 alone, judges upheld class [] action bans in
134 out of 162 cases”).
246
See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in
Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE. L.J. 2804, 2808, 2836 (2015) (discussing unfairness)
[hereinafter Resnik, Diffusing Disputes]; Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for
and Celebration of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1793, 1795 (2014)
(same) [hereinafter Resnik, Privatization].
247
Estlund, supra note 229, at 689–700 (estimating there are 34,000 “missing” arbitration employment cases covering civil rights, ADA, ERISA, FLSA, and FMLA each year); see also Resnik,
Diffusing Disputes, supra note 246, at 2808 (noting that despite the rise in mandatory arbitration
clauses, many litigants choose not to arbitrate).
248
See Estlund, supra note 229, at 698; Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Employers Prevail in
Arbitration Case, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/05/opinion-analysis-employersprevail-in-arbitration-case/ [https://perma.cc/PTD4-GE7M] (May 21, 2018) (stating that Epic Systems
is “huge victory for employers” because it reduces the number of cases they face); Gupta, supra note
221 (“The main effect is . . . to kill cases entirely . . . .”).
249
Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004); see, e.g., Alison Frankel,
Forced into Arbitration, 12,500 Drivers Claim Uber Won’t Pay Fees to Launch Cases, REUTERS (Dec. 6,
2018) [hereinafter Frankel, Forced Arbitration], https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-uber/
forced-into-arbitration-12500-drivers-claim-uber-wont-pay-fees-to-launch-cases-idUSKBN1O52C6
[https://perma.cc/J4Z6-7U27] (noting a Fitbit lawyer’s admission that “no rational litigant would pay a
$750 filing fee to arbitrate a claim over a product that costs $162”); Alison Frankel, Fitbit Lawyers
Reveal “Ugly Truth” About Arbitration, Judge Threatens Contempt, REUTERS (June 4, 2018), https://
www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-fitbit/fitbit-lawyers-reveal-ugly-truth-about-arbitration-judgethreatens-contempt-idUSKCN1IX5QM [https://perma.cc/5H7F-AYRD].
250
Erin Mulvaney, DoorDash Got Its Arbitration Wish, Costing Millions Upfront, BLOOMBERG
L.: DAILY LAB. REP., https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/doordash-got-its-arbitrationwish-costing-millions-upfront [https://perma.cc/K7QL-NDD5] (Feb. 12, 2020) (noting that this “strategy is picking up steam” and includes DoorDash, Uber, Lyft, Postmates, Chipotle Mexican Grill, and
Buffalo Wild Wings).
251
John Ryan, Poetic Justice: How Keller Lenkner Is Turning the Tables on Defendants and
Shaking Up the Plaintiffs’ Bar, LAWDRAGON (Apr. 6, 2020), https://www.lawdragon.com/lawyerlimelights/2020-04-06-poetic-justice-how-keller-lenkner-is-turning-the-tables-on-defendants-andshaking-up-the-plaintiffs-bar/ [https://perma.cc/H3E6-RS6B].

2022]

A New Civil Rights Act

2433

deluge of individual arbitration demands.252 Savvy plaintiffs’ counsel have
called defendants’ bluff and are using the very forum the latter fought to compel.253 With class arbitration bans roundly enforced, thousands of individual
workers are seeking to have their cases heard pursuant to agreements that
promise to pay their initial fees to move forward in arbitration.254 When filed
en masse, individual arbitrations can require a company to pay millions in filing fees alone, sometimes ten times greater than plaintiffs’ actual recovery.255
Defendants have failed to honor their bargains, paying a mere fraction of
the promised arbitration fees and blocking mass arbitration.256 They argue that
this new approach is an illegitimate means of extracting large settlements for
dubious claims and that counsel are conflicted, ill-equipped, or unauthorized to
represent these thousands of workers.257 Opposition to enforcement of their
own arbitration agreements, however, has not achieved success,258 leading
companies to settle most or all claims for many millions of dollars.259
252
Andrew Wallender, Corporate Arbitration Tactic Backfires as Claims Flood in, BLOOMBERG
L.: DAILY LAB. REP. (Feb. 11, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/corporatearbitration-tactic-backfires-as-claims-flood-in [https://perma.cc/U66A-ZHSF].
253
Id.
254
Id.
255
Thomas E. Birsic, Max A. Gelernter, Wesley A. Prichard & Elizabeth A. Hoadley, Mass Arbitration, Más Problems: Class-Action Procedures May Guide Solutions to Issues in Mass Arbitrations,
24 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 8, 9 (2021); Alison Frankel, “This Hypocrisy Will Not Be Blessed”:
Judge Orders DoorDash to Arbitrate 5,000 Couriers’ Claims, REUTERS (Feb. 11, 2020) [hereinafter
Frankel, Hypocrisy], https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-doordash/this-hypocrisy-will-not-beblessed-judge-orders-doordash-to-arbitrate-5000-couriers-claims-idUSKBN2052S1 [https://perma.
cc/4JGJ-SG3T]; see, e.g., O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 904 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding the arbitration agreement enforceable and that the employer is responsible for fees).
256
See Frankel, Forced Arbitration, supra note 249 (describing this trend and companies’ failure
to pay the required fees); Alison Frankel, 3,420 Lyft Drivers Claim the Company Won’t Pay Arbitration Fees to Launch Their Cases, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2018) [hereinafter Frankel, Lyft Drivers],
https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-lyft/3420-lyft-drivers-claim-the-company-wont-payarbitration-fees-to-launch-their-cases-idUSKBN1OD2KC [https://perma.cc/2ADE-NXEE].
257
See Frankel, Lyft Drivers, supra note 256 (noting that Lyft accused plaintiffs’ counsel of being
“hopelessly conflicted”); Dean Seal, Drivers at Fault for Their Own Stalled Arbitrations, Uber Says,
LAW360 (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1118931/drivers-at-fault-for-their-ownstalled-arbitrations-uber-says [https://perma.cc/BQ9Q-XW5A]; Alison Frankel, Beset by Arbitration
Demands, Postmates Resorts to Class Action to Settle Couriers’ Claims, REUTERS (Nov. 19, 2019)
[hereinafter Frankel, Beset], https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-massarb/beset-by-arbitrationdemands-postmates-resorts-to-class-action-to-settle-couriers-claims-idUSKBN1XT2UV
[https://perma.cc/5AXS-GZTG]; Frankel, Hypocrisy, supra note 255; Mulvaney, supra note 250 (explaining DoorDash’s contention that “the serial arbitration strategy amounted to a ‘shakedown’”).
258
See, e.g., Alaina Lancaster, “Poetic Justice”: Judge Alsup Berates DoorDash for Trying to
Escape Its Own Arbitration Agreement, LAW.COM: THE RECORDER (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.
law.com/therecorder/2019/11/26/poetic-justice-judge-alsup-berates-doordash-for-trying-to-escape-itsown-arbitration-agreement/ [https://perma.cc/5XXF-ZMWK] (noting that DoorDash’s efforts to navigate 2,236 individual arbitrations after trying to keep workers out of court for thirty years is “poetic
justice”); Transcript of Proceedings at 27, Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (N.D.
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It is unclear whether mass arbitration is an antidote to class arbitration
bans. The strategy has diminished one traditional barrier to some workers’ ability to arbitrate individually small-value claims—the incentive to attract a lawyer.260 Now, well-resourced, highly credentialed, and entrepreneurial formerdefense lawyers have begun fronting individual workers’ costs and forcing
employers to pay theirs, leveling the playing field261 and leveraging mass arbitration to encourage settlement negotiations.262
Although mass arbitration is growing and garnering support, its long-term
viability is uncertain.263 Initiating individual arbitrations en masse is relatively
expensive and burdensome compared to filing a class action.264 The tactic is
risky and onerous for plaintiffs’ counsel, of which there are few.265 Moreover,
notice to workers depends on attorney outreach rather than on class membership.266 Plaintiffs’ lawyers themselves disagree over whether massive numbers
Cal. 2020) (No. C 19-07545) (“[T]here is a lot of poetic justice here.”); Ryan, supra note 251 (responding to DoorDash’s tactic, judge balks, “This hypocrisy will not be blessed, at least by this order”); Mulvaney, supra note 250 (noting that Postmates’ refusal to pay fees was challenged as “contempt”); see also Turner v. Chipotle Mexican Grill, Inc., No. 1:14-cv-02612, 2018 WL 11314702, at
*3 (D. Colo. Nov. 20, 2018) (calling resistance “unseemly”).
259
See Andrew Wallender, Uber Settles “Majority” of Arbitrations for at Least $146M, BLOOMBERG L.: DAILY LAB. REP., https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/uber-sees-wage-suitsdropped-including-12-501-arbitration-claims [https://perma.cc/H2US-MBY2] (May 9, 2019) (explaining that a “large majority” of 60,000 Uber drivers dismissed their claims for a $146 million to $170
million settlement); see, e.g., Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without Prejudice, Abadilla v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-07343 (N.D. Cal. May 8, 2019); Notice of Voluntary Dismissal Without
Prejudice, Abarca v. Lyft, Inc., No. 3:18-cv-07502 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2019).
260
See Ryan, supra note 251; Max Kutner, Postmates, Couriers Agree to End Mass Arbitration
Appeals, LAW360 (Apr. 8, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1373233/postmates-couriers-agreeto-end-mass-arbitration-appeals [https://perma.cc/E8NY-PEUW].
261
Ryan, supra note 251; Kutner, supra note 260.
262
See Ryan, supra note 251; see also Frankel, Beset, supra note 257 (noting that Postmates prevents employees from suing as a class but is itself trying to use a class action to settle thousands of
individual claims); Kutner, supra note 260 (compelling Postmates to arbitrate thousands of individual
claims, costing $11,000,000 in arbitration fees, led to the settlement).
263
Ian Millhiser, DoorDash’s Anti-worker Tactics Just Backfired Spectacularly, VOX (Feb. 12,
2020), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/12/21133486/doordash-workers-10-million-forced-arbitrationclass-action-supreme-court-backfired [https://perma.cc/29KQ-M4P8] (“[I]t’s not all clear that this
tactic can be expanded into a broader attack on forced arbitration.”); Charlotte Garden, Opinion,
DoorDash’s Multimillion-Dollar Arbitration Mistake, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2020), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/02/16/doordashs-multimillion-dollar-arbitration-mistake/ [https://
perma.cc/J57D-8TAX] (“[E]fforts to harness the power of numbers and the upfront costs of arbitration
are not a comprehensive solution.”).
264
See, e.g., Garden, supra note 263 (noting that the DoorDash arbitration fee per worker was
$300 ($1,200,000 total), whereas the class action filing fee is $400).
265
Millhiser, supra note 263 (“[A]rbitrating thousands of cases on behalf of workers with small
claims is a terrible way for a lawyer to earn a living.”).
266
Mulvaney, supra note 250 (noting that outside a class action, “most affected employees will
never know” of their rights and potential relief).
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of individual arbitrations can realistically be resolved seriatim, with some
claiming the tactic’s only utility is leveraging employers to negotiate and settle
cases.267 As scholars have noted, the mass arbitration “work-around” is unlikely to be sustainable or its successes “scalable”—thereby justifying a more
permanent legislative fix.268
Ironically, in the face of mass arbitration, some companies realize the
benefit of class actions and class relief after having forced workers to act alone
in arbitration.269 The efficiency, cost savings, finality, and reputational costs
inure to defendants’ benefit. Indeed, some defendants have settled massive
quantities of individual arbitration claims on a class-wide basis, using aggregation defensively while unfairly denying workers the tool offensively.270
For example, in a situation that can only be called “irony upon irony,”271
DoorDash sought class relief after compelling individual arbitration pursuant
to its adhesion contract with 5,010 couriers alleging wage-and-hour violations.272 Faced with ten million dollars in arbitration filing fees, DoorDash attempted to stay arbitration and have its couriers join a pending state class action settlement.273 The federal district court judge, citing decades of employerimposed arbitration and class action bans, balked at this novelty, concluding:
“This hypocrisy will not be blessed, at least by this order.”274 Of course, what’s
good for the goose should be good for the gander, and access to aggregation
should be contractually available to worker and employer alike. The fact that
corporations themselves are turning to class resolution belies its utility.
The impact of the Court’s obstructionist arbitration jurisprudence may in
fact be understated.275 Although there is significant evidence that mandatory
arbitration is flawed, it is hard to grasp the full extent of the problem276 be-

267
See id. (noting that the counsel for DoorDash couriers in a $39,000,000 state class action settlement claims that “pursuing thousands of claims at once is a ‘farce’” and “game playing”).
268
Garden, supra note 263.
269
Ryan, supra note 251; see, e.g., Frankel, Beset, supra note 257 (“[W]hen the alternative is
worse, companies don’t really think class actions are so bad.”); Frankel, Hypocrisy, supra note 255.
270
See Frankel, Beset, supra note 257.
271
Order Re: Motion to Compel Arbitration, Motion to Stay Proceedings, and Motion to Seal at
8, Abernathy v. DoorDash, Inc., 438 F. Supp. 3d 1062 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (No. C 19-07545) [hereinafter
Order Re: Motion to Compel Arbitration].
272
Frankel, Hypocrisy, supra note 255.
273
Id.; Mulvaney, supra note 250.
274
Order Re: Motion to Compel Arbitration, supra note 271, at 8.
275
See Estlund, supra note 229, at 688–89 (“[D]ata on case outcomes are hotly contested . . . .”).
276
See id.; Estreicher et al., supra note 230, at 385 (comparing studies on arbitration versus litigation outcomes).

2436

Boston College Law Review

[Vol. 63:2403

cause of the forum’s confidential nature.277 Without a requirement that employers share data, systemic information is largely unavailable.278
Notwithstanding this information shortfall, the groundswell of dissatisfaction over mandatory arbitration among everyday workers and consumers, advocacy rights groups, scholars, and judges (Justices included) has percolated to
the point where a legislative course correction is necessary.279 Indeed, Congress recently passed, with bipartisan support, the Ending Forced Arbitration
of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021,280 which represents an
important start.
In sum, the Court has interpreted federal procedural law inconsistent with
the drafters’ intentions to provide facile access to the court system, frequent
determination on the merits, and extensive joinder of parties for civil rights
claims. This detachment has occurred not only in pleadings, aggregate litigation, and arbitration, but also in other procedural mechanisms like summary
judgment, discovery, and sanctions.281 The cumulative effect harms robust constitutional and civil rights enforcement, necessitating a broad new procedural
civil rights act.
The precipice has been reached. It is time to resuscitate process to protect
the pursuit of constitutional and civil rights. The next Part explores how.
II. INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCIES: WHY CONGRESS SHOULD
MAKE THE COURSE CORRECTION
The preceding Part established that the civil justice system has reached a
tipping point where the quantity and quality of procedural barriers is too high
for many claimants to effectively and robustly pursue remedies for civil rights
harms. Having concluded that the pendulum should swing back toward greater
court access, the next question is what institution and tools are best suited to do
this. This Part examines the institutional competencies of the Court, rulemakers, and Congress vis-à-vis each other and concludes that the latter is best
277
See Estlund, supra note 229, at 686 (describing how a “veil of secrecy . . . shields arbitration
from public scrutiny” and hides its problems). Such secrecy also stunts public knowledge and development of the law. Id. at 679.
278
Stone & Colvin, supra note 224, at 15. The same is true in the consumer context. In 2018,
there were 826,537,000 consumer arbitration agreements in force. Szalai, supra note 223, at 238.
279
See, e.g., DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 477 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 252 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
280
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, H.R. 4445,
117th Cong. (2021).
281
Malveaux, supra note 22, at 508–18 (describing disparate impact on civil rights); Briana Lynn
Rosenbaum, The Legislative Role in Procedural Rulemaking Through Incremental Reform, 97 NEB.
L. REV. 762, 767 (2019). A full examination of these other procedural barriers is beyond the scope of
the Article.
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suited to solve this problem.282 Section A will compare the institutional competencies of the Supreme Court and the rule-makers.283 Section B will compare
the rule-makers and Congress.284 Section C will conclude that Congress is best
suited to offer a solution.285
A. Supreme Court Versus Rule-Makers
The Court is less suited to reform civil process than the rule-makers.286
Numerous scholars have recognized the Court’s relative shortcomings287 and
the superiority of the formal rulemaking process.288 Although the Supreme
Court has the authority to set policy regarding procedural rules,289 its institutional capacity wanes compared to the Advisory Committee in key ways: (1)
access to resources and data; (2) practical experience and expertise; and (3)
democratic representation.
First, the Court has minimal resources and data collection capacity, which
can result in procedural jurisprudence untethered to empirical reality.290 For
example, absent empirical support, the Court concluded in Twombly that an
elevated pleading standard was the antidote to exorbitant discovery costs.291
Not only was this conclusion devoid of objective support, but it also encouraged district court judges to determine plausibility devoid of objective standards292—by using their “judicial experience and common sense.”293 Twombly’s
reliance on select, incomplete, and sparse data led to two errors, which Iqbal
cemented.294 The Court not only identified the wrong cure (a higher pleading
bar) but misdiagnosed the disease (exorbitant discovery costs, pressure on
See infra notes 286–390 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 286–333 and accompanying text.
284
See infra notes 334–367 and accompanying text.
285
See infra notes 368–390 and accompanying text.
286
This is distinct from the Court’s role in formal rule-making. Overview for the Bench, Bar, and
Public, U.S. COURTS, https://www.uscourts.gov/rules-policies/about-rulemaking-process/how-rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-and-public [https://perma.cc/KQL9-9LKB].
287
See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Plausibility Pleading Revisited and Revised: A Comment on Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 849, 883–85 (2010); Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the
Dilemmas of “General Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 537; Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure,
supra note 75, at 309–10, 313; Catherine T. Struve, The Paradox of Delegation: Interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1133–36 (2002).
288
Lumen N. Mulligan & Glen Staszewski, Institutional Competence and Civil Rules Interpretation, 101 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 64, 79–83 (2016) (available through HeinOnline).
289
See id. at 75, 82–83; Elizabeth G. Porter, Pragmatism Rules, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 123, 154
(2015); Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 47, at 1190, 1194, 1213.
290
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558–59 (2007).
291
See id. at 559–60.
292
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 75, at 313–14.
293
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
294
See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558–59.
282
283
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“cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases,”295 and judges’ incapacity to manage the situation).296 Relying on observations about judicial management almost two decades old297 and on discovery costs largely applicable to
antitrust cases,298 Twombly concluded that discovery costs reached the point
where Conley’s half-century old pleadings standard had to retire.299 The
Court’s concern over the enormity and pervasiveness of discovery costs, however, seems overblown.300 Many empirical studies do not support the familiar
sky-is-falling trope.301 Consequently, some have concluded that folklore is
largely driving the Court’s pleading jurisprudence.302 Given the Federal Rules’
trans-substantivity, the court-access problem is exacerbated because the plausibility standard applies to all civil actions, despite its shaky foundation.303
The Court is further hampered by the need to make decisions based on a
limited record, relying on piecemeal, idiosyncratic, individual cases as the basis for systemic procedural reform.304 Professor Suja A. Thomas has noted that
outlier cases rarely make good law for trans-substantive application.305 Potentially massive discovery costs in Twombly, the horrific 9/11 terrorist attack undergirding Iqbal, and the one-and-a-half million member class action brought
against Wal-Mart can create sharp edges and extreme postures. Instituting
broad, sweeping procedural reform from the margins undermines the legitimacy of rule trans-substantivity and the legitimacy of applicable case law.
The Court’s information deficit may be tempered by its ability to select
cases through certiorari and by amici who elucidate issues and diverse perspec-

295
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 47, at 1219–20 (explaining that “no brief . . . set forth any
data to support the Court’s finding of this legislative fact” and that the Court relied on “untested folk
wisdom” (citing Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95
IOWA L. REV. 821, 848 (2010)).
296
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559–60.
297
See id. at 559 (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635, 638–39
(1989)).
298
See id. at 558–59.
299
See id. at 563.
300
See Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies
and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1111–12 (2012).
301
See Malveaux, supra note 22, at 517 n.380; see also Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 47, at
1220 (citing “studies paint[ing] a far different picture of discovery costs”).
302
See Clermont & Yeazell, supra note 295, at 848.
303
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 681 (2009).
304
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 288, at 76; Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 47, at
1207–09.
305
See Suja A. Thomas, How Atypical, Hard Cases Make Bad Law (See, e.g., the Lack of Judicial
Restraint in Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Ricci), 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 989, 1006–08 (2013); Suja
A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215,
215–17.
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tives.306 The Court’s discretion gives it some control over its agenda. But the
Advisory Committee also has the resources to conduct impact studies and statistical analyses for studying procedural issues and recommending rule amendments.307
Second, the Court’s expertise lies in statutory and rule interpretation, not
rule creation and civil litigation.308 The Court lacks the practical experience
and familiarity with litigation practice in comparison to the Judicial Conference and the thousands of members of the bench, bar, and academia who participate in rulemaking through recommendations and the public comment process.309 The rule-makers are uniquely positioned and better poised to engage in
rule analysis and amendment.310 Indeed, the Judicial Conference, aided by the
Federal Judicial Center, is required to “carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect of the general rules of practice and procedure.”311 Promulgating a rule change, from inception to enactment, usually spans two to three
years, and involves significant participation from various stakeholders.312
Granted, this rulemaking process can be more cumbersome, expensive,
and time-consuming than adjudication, which also makes systemic, transsubstantive change through precedent.313 But the Court is no match for the Advisory Committee. As Justice Stevens noted, the Court was the wrong forum to
take on the ambitious enterprise of rewriting the pleadings rules, which im-

306
By way of illustration, the Supreme Court grants only one percent of all certiorari petitions
filed. See Ralph Mayrell & John Elwood, The Statistics of Relists Over the Past Five Terms: The
More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 4, 2022), https://www.
scotusblog.com/2022/01/the-statistics-of-relists-over-the-past-five-terms-the-more-things-change-themore-they-stay-the-same/ [https://perma.cc/XR8R-EC5G]. Moreover, the average number of amicus
briefs filed per case in the 2019–2020 term was about sixteen. See Mark Walsh, When the Supreme
Court Cites Your Amicus Brief, ABA J. (Aug. 26, 2021), https://www.abajournal.com/web/article/whenthe-supreme-court-cites-your-amicus-brief [https://perma.cc/AA6Y-WC8J].
307
See Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, supra note 286.
308
Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure, supra note 75, at 313; Mulligan & Staszewski, supra
note 288, at 78.
309
Overview for the Bench, Bar, and Public, supra note 286.
310
See id.
311
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 331).
312
About the Rulemaking Process, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesandPolicies/
rules/about-rulemaking.aspx [https://perma.cc/B9JS-H2GB].
313
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 47, at 1214–15, 1237–40 (describing complaints, political
unaccountability, burdensomeness, inefficiency, and ossification); Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note
288, at 84–85, 88, 89 (calling the rulemaking process “ossified” and time consuming); Robert G.
Bone, The Process of Making Process: Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural
Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887, 907–09 (1999) (describing legitimacy and efficacy critiques of rule-making
process); Stephen B. Burbank, Implementing Procedural Change: Who, How, Why, and When?, 49 ALA.
L. REV. 221, 244–46 (1997).
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pacts not only the federal courts, but state courts as well.314 Just months before
Twombly, the Court itself conceded the impropriety of revising the Rules outside the formal rulemaking process.315 The Court, however, breached its own
norm in Twombly and Iqbal by creating a plausibility threshold for all claims
made pursuant to Rule 8.316
The potential policy implications of the Court’s adjudicative rulemaking
are troubling and far-reaching.317 The Court diagnosed the problem as a discovery system rife with unreasonable costs, which, if true, could have justified
various access-oriented prescriptions.318 Because the Advisory Committee
studies and amends the Rules within an interrelated system, it is better positioned to appreciate the global impact a rule change may have and to craft efficient solutions responsive to the entire civil justice system.319 It is safe to say
that, relative to the Court, the rulemaking machinery offers better raw materials to craft and fix the civil rules.
Third, under a majoritarian theory of democracy, court adjudication is less
democratic than the rulemaking process because the latter offers greater opportunity for public participation.320 Public solicitation of input from over ten
thousand stakeholders, an extensive public notice-and-comment period, open
hearings, published proceedings, and multiple levels of review invite widespread participation, transparency, and accountability.321 Although the formal
rulemaking process has its drawbacks,322 it functions more democratically and
is more accountable to the people.323 Although the participation of diverse amici may temper the Court’s isolation, this is no match for the more democratic,

314
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 579 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“I would not
rewrite the Nation’s civil procedure textbooks and call into doubt the pleading rules of most of its
States without far more informed deliberation as to the costs of doing so. Congress has established [the rule-making process] for revisions of that order.” (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074
(2000 & Supp. IV))).
315
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 215–16 (2007).
316
See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV.
LITIG. 313, 334 (2012).
317
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 47, at 1196–97.
318
See, e.g., Malveaux, supra note 47, at 107.
319
Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 288, at 76; Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 47, at 1209.
320
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 47, at 1201–02, 1207–09, 1244.
321
See id.
322
See Carrington, supra note 30, at 617–18, 621, 633–34, 656–57; Stephen B. Burbank & Sean
Farhang, Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1596–97, 1613–14
(2014); Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 279–81, 283–84, 287, 290–92 (2009); Bone, supra note 313, at 909, 954;
Richard D. Freer, The Continuing Gloom About Federal Judicial Rulemaking, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
447, 449–51, 455, 460–61, 466, 468–73 (2013).
323
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 47, at 1245–46; Resnik, supra note 8, at 88.

2022]

A New Civil Rights Act

2441

far-reaching rulemaking apparatus.324 Thus, to the extent the Court’s interpretation of the Rules runs counter to the intent of the rule-makers, the democratic
process is undermined.325 The majority’s will is replaced with the will of nine
unelected, life-tenured Justices, relatively unaccountable to the citizenry.326
Alternatively, under a counter-majoritarian conception of democracy—
where the Court would protect the minority by preserving court access—the
Court is also falling short.327 The Court’s procedural jurisprudence is particularly insidious for disenfranchised groups, which have at times disproportionately relied on federal court intervention and independence when politics disfavor them.328 The Court has an opportunity to protect constitutional and civil
rights, rights that go to the heart of America’s aspirational identity and democratic ideals.329
More recently, however, the Court has abdicated this guardian role in the
procedural space, for example, by elevating the court-access bar to save corporations from large discovery costs330 or shield government officials from litigation.331 Professor Judith Resnik has noted how the key rulings of Concepcion
and Wal-Mart also “make plain that the constitutional concept of courts as a
basic public service provided by government is under siege.”332 This favoritism

324
See Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642,
4649 (1988).
325
Several commentators contend the Court’s decisions are political. See, e.g., David Orentlicher,
Politics and the Supreme Court: The Need for Ideological Balance, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 411, 413
(2018); Benjamin Johnson, The Supreme Court’s Political Docket: How Ideology and the Chief Justice Control the Court’s Agenda and Shape Law, 50 CONN. L. REV. 581, 609–22 (2018); Lee Epstein
& Eric Posner, Opinion, If the Supreme Court Is Nakedly Political, Can It Be Just?, N.Y. TIMES (July
9, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/09/opinion/supreme-court-nominee-trump.html [https://
perma.cc/QDT3-EAXC].
326
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 47, at 1244.
327
See id. at 1247.
328
See, e.g., Roy L. Brooks, Conley and Twombly: A Critical Race Theory Perspective, 52 HOW.
L.J. 31, 59–60 (2008).
329
See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, The Inescapability of Constitutional Theory, 80 U. CHI. L.
REV. 935, 950–51 (2013) (reviewing J. HARVIE WILKINSON III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE (2012)) (criticizing Judge Wilkinson’s approach); Erwin Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An
Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1207, 1210 (1984) (arguing that protection from the tyranny of the majority is essential to democracy). But see John E. Nowak,
Attacking the Judicial Protection of Minority Rights: The History Ploy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 608, 609–11
(1986) (book review).
330
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007); id. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(stating that a “transparent policy concern” of the Court’s decision was “protecting antitrust defendants—. . . some of the wealthiest corporations in our economy”).
331
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009).
332
Resnik, supra note 8, at 80.
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for the powerful runs counter to the Court’s protective democratic function,
thereby making the rule-makers and their process more appealing.333
B. Rule-Makers Versus Congress
The Court’s institutional shortcomings suggest that the Advisory Committee should solve the court-access problem. The rule-makers bring unparalleled
resources, expertise, and opportunity for public participation.334 The formal
rulemaking process, however, has its drawbacks, many of which Congress can
better address.335
Although deference to the Advisory Committee’s judgment in rulemaking
is appropriate, a word of caution is warranted against blind subjugation to monopoly rulemaking power.336 The rule-makers can broker power and propose
rules that further policy objectives too, as a study of Advisory Committee proposals from 1960 to 2014 demonstrates.337 For example, the Committee that
Chief Justice Earl Warren appointed in 1960 set forth rule proposals that favored plaintiffs and private enforcement, resulting in amendments in 1961,
1963, 1966, 1970, and 1971.338 Chief Justice Warren selected a Committee
primarily comprised of practitioners, then academics, and finally judges.339
Significantly, the Committee designed the 1966 revised class action rule, Rule
23(b)(2), to counter segregationists who used pupil-assignment laws to prevent
class certification and thwart systemic integration.340 Similarly, the 1970
amendment broadened the scope of discovery, enhancing plaintiffs’ capacity to
enforce substantive law like civil rights.341
Starting in the 1970s, in response to the 1960s civil rights movement and
concomitant public interest litigation boom, the Advisory Committee—which
Chief Justice Warren Burger reconstituted—sought to roll back this progress.342
The Committee, containing Republican-appointed federal judges and corporate
defense lawyers,343 considered various obstructionist proposals at the behest of
Republican-appointed Chief Justices Warren Burger, William Rehnquist, and
333
See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOOR: HOW YOUR CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS BECAME UNENFORCEABLE 91 (2017).
334
See Mulligan & Staszewski, supra note 47, at 1201–02, 1207–09, 1244.
335
See id. at 1199, 1204.
336
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 145, at 109.
337
Id. at 83 (“[T]he rulemaking proposals most likely to elicit ideological behavior are precisely
those that will affect private enforcement.”).
338
Id. at 71–72.
339
Id. at 78–79.
340
See Marcus, Flawed, supra note 90, at 684–85, 695–96; Malveaux, supra note 87, at 332.
341
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 145, at 77.
342
Id. at 97–99.
343
Id. at 79–82, 84–85.
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John Roberts.344 For example, proposed amendments restricting Rule 23 class
actions, limiting Rule 26’s discovery scope, expanding Rule 11’s attorney
sanctions, and incentivizing Rule 68’s settlement goals obstructed private
rights enforcement and supported an anti-civil rights enforcement agenda.345
In general, Committee proposals that impacted private enforcement between 1960 and 2014 fell into three periods: 1960–1971 (favoring plaintiffs),
1971–1991 (favoring plaintiffs and defendants), and 1991–2014 (favoring defendants).346 The overall trend, however, was a steady decline of Committee
proposals favoring plaintiffs, from 87% to 19%.347
This favoritism works because the nature of process text masks such policy preferences. Shielded by technical jargon and the language of neutrality,
rule-makers have wide girth to propose seemingly innocuous, but harmful,
rules.348 Because the rules exist at a high level of generality and cut across varied substantive law, they perform as “neutral” standard-bearers. This licenses
judges to “interpret” them in ways that serve policy interests and lead to exclusionary outcomes with impunity.349
Although more democratic than court adjudication, the rulemaking process is not as democratic as the legislative process. The Chief Justice’s appointees comprise the Judicial Conference. This unelected, select group of judges,
lawyers, and academics functions relatively independently and beyond view of
the general public. Thus, potential bias and political influence may taint the
democratic nature of formal rulemaking. Moreover, the notice-and-comment
process may itself be captured by interest group politics, resulting in the loudest voices having the greatest ear of the Advisory Committee.350
Not only is the rule-maker selection process less democratic, but the
composition of the rule-makers is also less representative than Congress. Professors Stephen B. Burbank and Sean Farhang have found that from 1971
through 2014, Republican-appointed judges “held [seventy percent] of Article
III judge seats” on the Advisory Committee, were over twice as likely to serve
on the Committee, and constituted a majority in forty-one years of the fortyId. at 66–67.
Id. at 66–67, 102, 104; Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Anti-Plaintiff Pending Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Pro-Defendant Composition of the Federal Rulemaking Committees, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1083, 1144–52 (2015); see id. at 1140 (“[D]efense speakers . . . at
the [2010] Duke Conference outnumbered plaintiffs’ speakers almost two-to-one.” (citing ADVISORY
COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF PRAC. & PROC., THE JUDICIAL CONF. OF THE U.S.,
REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES 19–23 (2010))).
346
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 145, at 94.
347
Id. at 94–95.
348
Id. at 67–68.
349
See id. at 68.
350
See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 837 (1991).
344
345
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three year period.351 Moreover, members of the Committee are 331 times more
likely to be chosen as Committee Chair, who sets the rule-making agenda.352
Because of this pipeline, Republicans have occupied eleven of the twelve
chairs during this period.353
Not only have Republican-appointed judges dominated the Committee—so
have white men.354 From 1971 through 2017, white judges were five times more
likely than those of color to serve on the Committee.355 White judges accounted
for “89% of the judge-years and 98% of both committee service-years and appointments or reappointments.”356 Not surprisingly, the racial demographics of
the Chair of the Committee are even worse: the “inexorable zero”!357
The lack of political and demographic diversity matters to civil rights
outcomes.358 Studies indicate that factors like gender and race impact judicial
decision-making for certain key civil rights issues.359 Moreover, Democrats
have generally favored private rights enforcement as essential to civil rights,
whereas Republicans have either opposed or selectively favored it to promote a
socially conservative agenda.360
Finally, formal rulemaking is not the antidote because it risks violating
the Rules Enabling Act’s prohibition against creating rules that alter substantive rights.361 The Act empowers the Committee to: (1) “prescribe general rules
of practice and procedure,” (2) so long as they do “not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right.”362 This two-pronged prescription limits the rulemakers’ authority to impact substantive rights.

BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 145, at 85, 87–88.
Id. at 89–91.
353
Id. at 91.
354
Id. at 83–88; see Brooke D. Coleman, One Percent Procedure, 91 WASH. L. REV. 1005, 1065
(2016) (criticizing the rule-making process’s homogeneity). Chairwoman Judge Lee Rosenthal, a white
woman, and Committee member Dean and Professor A. Benjamin Spencer, an African-American
man, are notable exceptions.
355
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 145, at 88.
356
Id.
357
See Int’l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977) (quoting
United States v. T.I.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 517 F.2d 299, 315 (5th Cir. 1975)); BURBANK & FARHANG, supra
note 145, at 89; Brooke D. Coleman, #SoWhiteMale: Federal Civil Rulemaking, 113 NW. U. L. REV.
ONLINE 52, 60–66 (2018), https://northwesternlawreview.org/articles/sowhitemale-federal-civil-rulemaking/ [https://perma.cc/YJ8X-RY89].
358
Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52
ALA. L. REV. 529, 613–14 (2001) (“[Rule-makers] ha[ve] become distinctly more conservative in
both ideology and social background.”).
359
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 145, at 86.
360
Id. at 86, 96.
361
28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074.
362
Id. § 2072(a)–(b). The REA sets forth the rule-making process. Id. §§ 2071–2077.
351
352
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Much of the reforms suggested would implicate the Rules Enabling Act
(“REA”). For example, the Court has concluded that its interpretation and application of Rule 23 has the potential to breach the REA.363 In Wal-Mart, the
Court rejected plaintiffs’ efforts to use a sampling method that would determine back pay for class members in place of individualized Title VII hearings
because it would enlarge the class members’ substantive rights under the
REA.364 Although the Justices disagree over how to apply the REA, a rule focused on bolstering court access for constitutional and civil rights claims risks
running afoul of the REA.365
Despite the Committee’s overall anti-plaintiff trend from 1960 to 2017, it
has not fundamentally amended the Rules to achieve exclusionary outcomes
given the REA’s parameters.366 Attempts at amending rules regarding notice
pleading, broad discovery, class actions, summary judgment, and settlement
initiatives have only gone so far.367
C. Congress as Solution
Because of the limited institutional capacities of the Court and rulemakers, Congress must step into the breach.368 By tailoring procedure to constitutional and civil rights claims, legislation can swing the pendulum back to
where courts can hear these claims robustly, determine them on the merits, and
363
See, e.g., Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1046 (2016); Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 367 (2011); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 845 (1999); Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613 (1997).
364
Wal-Mart, 564 U.S. at 367; see Tyson Foods, 136 S. Ct. at 1048 (quoting Wal-Mart, 564 U.S.
at 367).
365
Compare A. Benjamin Spencer, Substance, Procedure, and the Rules Enabling Act, 66 UCLA
L. REV. 654, 665, 661–72, 686 (2019) (exploring the scope of the REA), and Shady Grove Orthopedic
Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393, 424–25 (2010) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment) (emphasizing that the REA does not allow the Court to affect substantive
rights), with Shady Grove at 406–07, 411 (plurality opinion) (claiming that it is insignificant whether a
rule affects substantive rights).
366
BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 145, at 97–103, 116–19.
367
Id. at 103–12, 116–19. The 2015 amendments, which incorporate a proportionality requirement into discovery, may be an exception. According to Chief Justice Roberts, these are a “big deal”
and “mark a significant change.” JOHN ROBERTS, 2015 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 4, 5 (2015).
368
See Carrington, supra note 30, at 666–67 (“Congress must act or many of its laws will go
down the drain of weak enforcement . . . .”). Congressional action, however, is only appropriate when
following an inclusive, democratic process. This was not done following modest class action rule
reforms, leading to the demise of the Fairness in Class Action Litigation Act (FICALA) of 2017. H.R.
985, 115th Cong. § 105 (2017) (passed by the House on Mar. 9, 2017); see Jessica Erickson, Heightened Procedure, 102 IOWA L. REV. 61, 64 (2016) (arguing that Congress can use procedural tools and
principles to address cost asymmetry and frivolous litigation); Glover, supra note 11, at 2129–30
(stating that procedural reform is appropriate through substantive law or rule-making, not the courts).
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systemically enforce them. Congress is institutionally better poised to correct
regressive procedural rulings for a number of reasons.
First, empowered to make substance-specific procedure and to access
empirical data, Congress is equipped to address the obstructionist trend.369 Although the process from bill to law is far more complex than School House
Rock suggests, a statute could squarely address the backlash.370 Corrective legislation plays an important regulatory function, reining in jurisprudence that
has veered too far from the drafters’ original intent.
Course corrections can be broad, as the Civil Rights Act of 1991 illustrates,371 or surgical, as the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act illustrates.372 Drafters
crafted such legislation to address, inter alia, procedural deficiencies in the
civil litigation system vis-à-vis civil rights enforcement. They convey restorative legislation’s capacity to address Court obstructionism.
Admittedly, there must not only be the way, but the will to enact inclusionary process. When the rule-makers first promulgated the Federal Rules,
Congress played a de minimis role in the development of procedure.373 It entered
the fray in the 1980s to promote court access and private rights enforcement,374
but then later to secure retrenchment.375 For example, a Republican-led Congress
enacted major procedural reform laws like the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”),376 the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PLRA”),377 and the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”)378—all obstructionist statutes.
Second, Congress—like the rule-makers—has the advantage of a coercive
power to create broad, uniform, predictable outcomes.379 Although civil rights
369
See Charlton C. Copeland, Seeing Beyond Courts: The Political Context of the Nationwide
Injunction, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 813 (2020).
370
See id.
371
See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 2 and 42 U.S.C.); see also Americans With Disabilities Act Amendments Act of
2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (creating new
standards to combat discrimination).
372
Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009).
373
Glover, supra note 11, at 2113.
374
Id. at 2113–14.
375
Id. at 2114.
376
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995)
(enacting heightened pleading standards).
377
Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-66 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 11, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
378
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.); see Richard L. Marcus, Modes of Procedural Reform, 31 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 157, 175–84 (2008) (discussing CAFA, PSLRA, and the Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990).
379
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
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counsel and some lower courts have dexterously navigated the obstacles the
Court has placed on the procedural course, this does not countenance inaction.
Such legal strategies and judicial interpretations are discretionary. Restorative
legislation, by contrast, would enhance predictability, uniformity, and fairness
of results across constitutional and civil rights cases by requiring a lower procedural floor.380
Admittedly, corrective legislation presumes Congress can fix the problems discussed above by yet another law. If the Court’s interpretive lens is
skewed in an obstructionist direction, the Court may overreach or interpret a
new law in the same way. For example, although the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
discussed below, re-anchored a recalcitrant Court to Congress’s original desire
for robust civil rights enforcement, the Act did not eliminate judicial resistance
to this objective. As scholars have concluded, although the Act “had a meaningful restraining effect on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence[,] . . . in the
most ideological cases . . . the Court has remained decidedly pro-defendant.”381
Thus, like any legislation, a new civil rights law fixes the problem of obstructionist jurisprudence only to the extent the Court more generally recognizes
congressional authority.
Third, as discussed above, Congress benefits from greater representativeness and democratic legitimacy.382 As the branch tasked with expressing the
will of a pluralistic society, Congress can craft process that reflects the public’s
priorities. Even so, given the large role that powerful special interest groups
and wealthy corporations play in modern politics, Congress risks being captured.383 Outcomes may reflect resource and power differentials more than majority rule.384 To the extent that such stakeholders exert disproportionate influence on the lawmaking process, the benefits of Congress’s representativeness
and democracy are lost. Thus, the law as salve is limited and a variety of approaches are needed to make systemic change. The bottom line is that Congress, though itself flawed, institutionally ranks ahead on the democracy front.385

380
But see Rosenbaum, supra note 281, at 804–18 (noting that Congress’s legislating procedural
reforms alters remedies for substantive claims, lacks transparency, and is “unmoored from adjudication and practice-based normative values”).
381
See, e.g., Michael Selmi, The Supreme Court’s Surprising and Strategic Response to the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 281, 282, 290–91 (2011).
382
This notion is admittedly idealistic and aspirational. The electorate excludes many members of
American society, including: some felons, non-English speakers, persons with disabilities, and younger people. Voter suppression efforts further undermine true representation.
383
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
384
See Caitlin E. Borgmann, Rethinking Judicial Deference to Legislation Fact-Finding, 84 IND.
L.J. 1, 16 (2009).
385
See id.
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Finally, Congress is better suited to set and promote societal norms and
values. A new procedural civil rights law would signal and reaffirm to the public the nation’s commitment to equality, democracy, and due process. Although
procedural jurisprudence seeks to address efficiency-oriented problems like
judicial case overload386 and resource limitations, process law should also address issues of inequitable access, exclusion, and rights underenforcement.387
The very first rule sets the expectation: rules are meant to ensure not only
“speedy, and inexpensive” outcomes, but “just” ones too.388
Statutory law plays a vital role in allocating power and signaling who
matters in society.389 As scholars have noted, “[r]eforms that discourage court
access for minorities asserting ‘marginal’ rights claims reflect value judgments
about the purposes of adjudication and the desirability of broad-based participation in the litigation process.”390 It is time for the law to reflect that the experiences of marginalized people matter.
The next Part examines the extent to which restorative legislation could
succeed today, drawing on two catalysts to civil rights restorative statutes.
III. IT IS TIME FOR A NEW CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
Having determined that Congress is the appropriate driver and that legislation is the appropriate vehicle to counteract procedural law undermining civil
rights enforcement, the next question is whether this is the right time for a new
law.391 Section A first considers some catalysts for corrective civil rights legislation.392 Section B then examines contemporary conditions similar to those
that existed when Congress passed other corrective civil rights legislation—the
sweeping Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the more targeted Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act393—was passed.394 Section C ends with an analysis of conditions that
386
A litigation “explosion” may result from the paucity of other options available to the marginalized. See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., The Priority of Human Rights in Court Reform, in THE POUND
CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 87, 87–88 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R.
Wheeler eds., 1979); William T. Gossett, Bernard G. Segal & Chesterfield Smith, Foreword to THE
POUND CONFERENCE, supra, at 11.
387
See THE POUND CONFERENCE, supra note 386, at 87–110 (reciting Dean Pound’s assertion
that “in discouraging litigation we encourage wrongdoing” (quoting ROSCOE POUND, THE SPIRIT OF
THE COMMON LAW 134 (1921))).
388
See FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
389
MICHÈLE ALEXANDRE, THE NEW FRONTIERS OF CIVIL RIGHTS LITIGATION, at xix–xxviii
(2019).
390
Eric K. Yamamoto, Efficiency’s Threat to the Value of Accessible Courts for Minorities, 25
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 341, 345 (1990).
391
See infra notes 396–542 and accompanying text.
392
See infra notes 396–404 and accompanying text.
393
A full examination of all of the factors that lead to ameliorative legislation (including these
two exemplars) is beyond the scope of this Article.
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may signal whether a restorative procedural civil rights act could prevail today.395
A. Catalysts for Corrective Civil Rights Legislation
There are numerous conditions that catalyze corrective civil rights legislation to obstructionist jurisprudence. As scholars have observed, the creation of
law involves interaction among a variety of stakeholders such as judges, lawyers, politicians, social activists, and media figures.396 This complex contextual
interaction accounts for why and when restorative statutes arise.
The initial catalyst is the Court’s own errant jurisprudence. The quantity
and quality of its regressive cases are the starting points. A great number of
regressive cases or just one particularly egregious one can tip the scales.
Second, the Court itself may flag its own potential error from within,
foreshadowing the propriety of corrective legislation. The presence of a strong
dissent often achieves this.397 Professor Lani Guinier identifies dissenting opinions as an opportunity for Justices to “play a democracy-enhancing role” by
inviting in those “unlearned in the law” to join the conversation.398 This is an
act of “democratically-oriented jurisprudence” or “demosprudence”—the philosophy that “lawmaking is a collaborative enterprise between formal elites . . .
and ordinary people” and that “the wisdom of the people” should be front and
center of this enterprise.399 The goal of a demosprudential dissent is making
sure that the views of the judicial majority do not squash political dialogue.400
When done right, the dissenter signals not only the interventionist role of Congress, but that of nonlegal actors and “role-literate participants”401 in the lawmaking process.402 Scholars have noted how the “Court can catalyze change”
through dissent by speaking clearly and plainly to mobilized constituencies

See infra notes 405–470 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 471–542 and accompanying text.
396
See TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF
THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 210, 266 (2011).
397
Even some majority opinions can play this role and urge congressional action.
398
Lani Guinier, Courting the People: Demosprudence and the Law/Politics Divide, 89 B.U. L.
REV. 539, 546 (2009).
399
Id. at 544–45; see also Robert Post, Law Professors and Political Scientists: Observations on
the Law/Politics Distinction in the Guinier/Rosenberg Debate, 89 B.U. L. REV. 581, 582 (2009)
(“[C]ourts do not end democratic debate about the meaning of rights and the law; they are participants
within that debate.”).
400
Guinier, supra note 398, at 547.
401
Id. at 554; see Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1339–48 (2006).
402
Guinier, supra note 398, at 543, 546, 548–49.
394
395
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and ordinary people.403 The law is thus shaped via grassroots activism, media
exposure, and political mobilization.
Finally, and most pragmatically, the party affiliations of the chambers of
Congress and the President, their degrees of partisanship,404 and the collective
political context influence the likelihood that Congress will enact restorative
civil rights legislation. The extent to which parties dominate and operate lockstep or find common ground foreshadow whether corrective civil rights legislation is possible.
B. Exemplar Restorative Civil Rights Acts
The aforementioned catalysts offer lessons and presage whether a new
procedural civil rights act would be successful today. This Section briefly examines catalysts vis-à-vis two distinctly different restorative civil rights statutes: the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.405
1. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
The most sweeping and comprehensive restorative civil rights law in
American history—the Civil Rights Act of 1991—has much to teach us about
the propriety of one today. As an initial matter, the quantity and quality of Supreme Court decisions undermining Congress’s intent to provide robust civil
rights enforcement convinced Congress of the need for corrective legislation.406 With the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress overturned eight Supreme
Court cases with a “ferocity” not exhibited since Congress’s repudiation of
Dred Scott v. Sandford,407 via the post-Civil War amendments.408 The Civil
Rights Act of 1991 followed a series of eight other restorative civil rights laws
enacted from 1978 to 1990, in response to serious and consistent statutory misinterpretation.409 Thus, within a fifteen year period, Congress passed a total of
nine civil rights statutes to correct sixteen Supreme Court decisions.410 This
Id. at 554; see id. at 550, 557, 559–60.
A full examination of this issue is beyond the scope of this Article. See Copeland, supra note
369, at 809 (“The existence and scope of partisan polarization in Congress has become one of the
most studied issues in American politics.”).
405
This Article considers two exemplars, but others are possible. Consider the sweeping Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act of 2008, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2008) (correcting rulings
misaligned with congressional intent), and the more targeted Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978,
42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (amending Title VII to include pregnancy within sex discrimination).
406
Eric Schnapper, Statutory Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1095, 1095–96 (1993).
407
60 U.S. 393 (1857).
408
Schnapper, supra note 406, at 1095–96.
409
Id. at 1096–98.
410
Id.
403
404
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massive legislative course correction suggests the flawed nature of the Court’s
jurisprudence and statutory interpretive approach.411
In addition to the sheer volume, the subject matter of the cases the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 corrected was significant. Although Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 had been amended before, the 1991 Act was by far the
most comprehensive.412 The 1991 Act responded to the Court’s “deeply conservative turn on issues of civil rights,” especially pertaining to employment
discrimination.413 Although the 1991 Act reversed eight cases, it focused primarily on three that the Supreme Court decided in 1989: Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union;414 Martin v. Wilks;415 and Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.416
These three major cases, in combination with others, made it harder for plaintiffs challenging discrimination to obtain relief.417 Not only did Congress’s restorative legislation overturn substantive law barriers, but it also eliminated
procedural ones.418
Not surprisingly, a dissenting opinion foreshadowed the birth of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 in one of the most controversial and significant cases that
the Act overturned.419 Justice Stevens’s dissent in Wards Cove set the record
straight regarding Congress’s intent underlying Title VII.420 There, he noted the
statute’s goal to prohibit not only intentional discrimination, but also neutral
employment practices that have a negative disparate impact on the job opportunities of protected classes of people.421 Justice Stevens contended that ConId. at 1098–1100.
Selmi, supra note 381, at 281.
413
Id. at 283.
414
491 U.S. 164, 168–71(1989) (restricting race discrimination claims to contract formation under § 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866); see Selmi, supra note 381, at 283 (noting that “the Court
limit[ed] the statute’s reach . . . aggressively and on its own initiative”); see also John Hope Franklin,
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 Revisited, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1138–39 (1990) (underscoring the
Court’s efforts to undermine § 1981).
415
490 U.S. 755, 758–59, 761–63 (1989) (undermining consent decree finality and remedial provisions in a discrimination case by permitting intervenors’ collateral attack). See generally George M.
Strickler, Jr., Martin v. Wilks, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1557 (1990) (critiquing Martin v. Wilks).
416
490 U.S. 642, 660 (1989) (imposing the burden of proving business-necessity defense on
plaintiffs in disparate impact cases).
417
Selmi, supra note 381, at 286–87.
418
See, e.g., Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911–12 (1989) (holding that a claim
against a seniority system accrues at the time of adoption, not application).
419
See Schnapper, supra note 406, at 1099 n.39; W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83,
111–16 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (outlining Congress’s correction of the Court’s literal reading
of civil rights statutes, concluding “[o]nly time will tell” regarding § 1988’s “prevailing party” language); see also United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, 434 U.S. 192, 218 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“The mischief the Court fashions today may be short lived. Both the House and Senate have
passed amendments to the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967].”).
420
490 U.S. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
421
Id. at 662–69.
411
412
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gress put the burden of proof on the employer to prove the business necessity
affirmative defense—a weighty standard422 that was rejected by the majority.423
Justice Stevens’s dissent concluded its analysis with a signal to Congress
that it can, and perhaps should, make the next move: “Congress frequently revisits this statutory scheme and can readily correct our mistakes if we misread
its meaning.”424 This signal sounds in Guinier’s demosprudence. The dissent
situates Wards Cove in the larger context of the Court retrenchment of civil
rights through statutory misinterpretation and Congress’s resurrection of rights
through restorative laws that protect everyday people’s interest. The dissent
moves the pendulum closer toward court access, law enforcement and democratic goals.
Another major catalyst for the passage of this historical course correction
was the political context in which the legislation unfolded. With the Democrats
controlling both the House and Senate, Congress moved quickly to pass the
Civil Rights Act of 1990.425 Republican President George H. W. Bush, however, vetoed the Act, responding to the spurious political argument that the Act’s
strong disparate impact theory would strengthen affirmative action and force
innocent employers to adopt quotas to avoid liability.426 Democrats were unable to stave off the veto, falling short by one vote.427
This legislative setback sent Congress back to the negotiation table, with
little prospect of a different outcome—until the Clarence Thomas Senate Judiciary hearings, which significantly shifted the political landscape and therefore
increased the likelihood of restorative civil rights legislation.428 Professor Anita
Hill’s accusations of sexual harassment against Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas resulted in public hearings on the matter specifically and in a
national conversation about the problem of sexual harassment more generally.
As scholars have concluded, “Those hearings ultimately contributed to the pas-

Id. at 664–67; see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 671–72 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
424
Id. at 672 (first citing Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 644 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring); then citing Runyun v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 190–92 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring); then
citing McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 376 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); then citing
Comm’r v. Fink, 483 U.S. 89, 102–05 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting); and then citing Rodriquez de
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 486 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
425
Selmi, supra note 381, at 287.
426
Id. at 287–88; see Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L.
REV. 701, 706, 763–67 (2006); Ian Ayres & Peter Siegelman, The Q-Word as Red Herring: Why Disparate Impact Liability Does Not Induce Hiring Quotas, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1487, 1489–90 (1996).
427
Selmi, supra note 381, at 288 n.38; see Neil A. Lewis, President’s Veto of Rights Measure
Survives by 1 Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at A1.
428
See Selmi, supra note 381, at 288–89.
422
423
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sage of the [1991 Civil Rights Act]” and indeed, it probably would not have
been enacted without them.429
To punctuate this public tutorial, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling at the time illustrating the inadequate legal protections for sexual
harassment victims.430 In 1989, in Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth,
Inc.,431 the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s $1.00 award of nominal
damages and attorney’s fees, although Diane Swanson proved that she was
sexually harassed, that this impacted her psychological well-being, and that
this was a term and condition of her employment.432 Because Title VII did not
provide damages, the Seventh Circuit not only denied her nominal ones, but
took the employer’s court costs out of her paycheck.433 The Swanson court
made clear that it was merely enforcing Title VII as written, which signaled the
need for statutory reform, much like a demosprudential dissent.434
Republican opposition to the restorative civil rights bill waned with the
confirmation hearings and growing public concern over sexual harassment.435
Racial bias also tainted Republican leadership. The specter of Ku Klux Klan
member David Duke’s run for governor of Louisiana during this period stained
the Republican Party’s reputation, encouraging Republicans to reconsider the
embattled civil rights restorative bill,436 whose primary catalysts were the race
cases Patterson, Wilks, and Wards Cove.437
This complex confluence of factors, among others, contributed to the passage of the momentous Civil Rights Act of 1991.
2. The Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
Another instructive restorative civil rights law is the Lilly Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act of 2009 (“Ledbetter Act”),438 the first law passed under the Obama
Administration. In contrast to the sweeping Civil Rights Act of 1991, the
429
Id. (“[W]ithout the hearings, there may not have been a [1991 Civil Rights Act].”); see also
Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act: The “Impossibility” of Permanent Reform, 45 RUTGERS L. REV. 965, 965 (1993) (emphasizing the importance
of the Clarence Thomas hearings on the passage of the bill).
430
See Swanson v. Elmhurst Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 882 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1989).
431
Id.
432
Id. at 1239–40.
433
Id. at 1240; Selmi, supra note 381, at 289.
434
See Swanson, 882 F.2d at 1240 (“If Congress wishes to amend the provisions of Title VII to
provide a remedy of damages, it can do so.” (quoting Bohen v. City of East Chicago, 799 F.2d 1180,
1184 (7th Cir. 1986))).
435
See Culp, supra note 429, at 965.
436
Neal Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955, 996
(1993).
437
Selmi, supra note 381, at 294.
438
Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 note).
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Ledbetter Act was a targeted strike to correct a purely procedural problem.
Although the Act’s purpose and scope were narrower, it nevertheless illustrates
conditions in which corrective civil rights legislation may succeed.
Unlike the 1991 Act, the Ledbetter Act was enacted in response to a single 2007 Supreme Court case, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,439
which held that the statute of limitations had run, thereby foreclosing Lilly
Ledbetter’s claim of gender discrimination in pay against her longtime employer Goodyear. After working at the Alabama plant for almost two decades,
Ledbetter discovered that she was significantly underpaid compared to her
male counterparts, including those she had trained and those with far less seniority.440 By the end of her career, Ledbetter was being paid fifteen-to-forty
percent less than her similarly situated male colleagues.441 Ledbetter did not
realize this insidious incremental growing pay gap until she received an anonymous tip.442 Upon learning of this inequity, she filed a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and a federal lawsuit, alleging sex discrimination in violation of, inter alia, Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.443 The jury returned a verdict in her favor, awarding $223,776 in
backpay and over $3,000,000 in punitive damages.444
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that
Ledbetter’s pay discrimination claims were time-barred.445 The Supreme Court
agreed.446 It rejected Ledbetter’s argument that every time Goodyear issued her
a paycheck, this constituted a discriminatory act within the statute of limitations.447 Instead, the Court held that each pay-setting decision was the discrete
act that triggered her obligation to file her EEOC charge within the 180-day
statute of limitations.448 According to Ledbetter, by nullifying the jury verdict,
the Court had “sided with big business” and put her in the untenable position
of requiring her to file before learning of the gross pay disparity.449
550 U.S. 618 (2007), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009.
Justice Denied? The Implications of the Supreme Court’s Ledbetter v. Goodyear Employment
Discrimination Decision: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Lab., 110th Cong. 10, 12 (2007)
[hereinafter Ledbetter Hearing] (statement of Lilly Ledbetter); Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 643 (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting).
441
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 649 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
442
Ledbetter Hearing, supra note 440, at 10.
443
Id.
444
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting record below); Ledbetter Hearing, supra note 440, at 10.
445
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 622–23 (majority opinion).
446
Id. at 621.
447
Id.
448
Id.
449
Lilly Ledbetter, Address to the Democratic National Convention (Aug. 26, 2008) (transcript
available at https://www.c-span.org/video/?c4790709/user-clip-lilly-ledbetter-dnc [https://perma.cc/
Z9QQ-QAWA]); see Ledbetter Hearing, supra note 440, at 10.
439
440
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Congress reversed course by enacting the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act,
which clarified that each paycheck issued constituted a discrete, discriminatory
act that started the statute-of-limitations clock.450 Congress amended Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act, along with others, surgically striking the Court’s
cramped interpretation of what triggers an employee’s duty to file.451 Congress
found that Ledbetter significantly undermined statutory protections against
discrimination “by unduly restricting the time period in which victims of discrimination can challenge and recover for discriminatory compensation decisions,” contrary to Congress’s intent.452
Although the Act targets a single case, the restorative statute more broadly highlighted the all-male majority’s disconnect with gendered workplace dynamics and checked its narrow understanding of Title VII’s vision.453
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg’s strong Ledbetter dissent encouraged this
restorative civil rights statute in no small measure, which is a perfect example
of demosprudence.454 Ginsburg, the only female justice on the Court at the
time, read her dissent out loud from the bench—an act reflecting the gravity
and magnitude of the majority’s error. Indeed, her oral dissent made the front
page of the Washington Post.455 In her dissent, she spoke not only to her colleagues, but to women across the country about the ramifications of the Court’s
decision for women’s capacity to challenge sex-based pay disparities:456
[I]nitially you may not know that men are receiving more for substantially similar work. . . . If you sue only when the pay disparity
becomes steady and large enough to enable you to mount a winnable
case, you will be cutoff at the court’s threshold for suing too late
. . . .457

Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 note).
See id.
452
Id. § 2(1).
453
See id. § 2, 2(2) (“Congress finds . . . [t]he limitation imposed by the Court on the filing of
discriminatory compensation claims ignores the reality of wage discrimination and is at odds with the
robust application of the civil rights laws that Congress intended.”).
454
See generally Guinier, supra note 398 (describing the importance of Ginsberg’s dissent).
455
See Robert Barnes, Over Ginsburg’s Dissent, Court Limits Bias Suits, WASH. POST (May 30,
2007), https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/05/29/AR2007052900740.html
[https://perma.cc/LP65-ME4B].
456
See Guinier, supra note 398, at 540–41.
457
Oral Dissent of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg at 4:25, Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (No. 05-1074), http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2006/2006_05_1074/
opinion [https://perma.cc/DH32-FCSA]; Lani Guinier, The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Foreword:
Demosprudence Through Dissent, 122 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40–41 (2008).
450
451
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If, however, you “sue early on,” before knowing if sex-discrimination is afoot,
“you will likely lose such a less-than-fully baked case.”458 Referencing a similar misinterpretation of Title VII that led to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Ginsburg’s dissent signaled that Congress should take it from here, concluding,
“Once again, the ball is in Congress’ court.”459
Ginsburg’s dissent not only invited Congress to react, but also acted as a
“clarion call” to “role-literate participants” like the National Women’s Law
Center and other women’s rights advocates incentivized to redirect the law
toward robust legislative remedies and enforcement.460 Moreover, by addressing women directly and individually by using the term “you,” Ginsburg’s dissent invited the greater public into the lawmaking process.461 It mobilized activists, advocates, and Lilly Ledbetter herself to push for restorative civil rights
legislation.462 A grassroots campaign, spearheaded by Ledbetter and showcased
by the media, took hold.463 As scholars note, Ginsburg’s dissent is a prime example of demosprudence.464
Finally, partisan politics played a key role in the Ledbetter Act’s passage.
Shortly after Ginsburg’s dissent, House Democrats passed the Ledbetter Fair
Pay Act of 2007.465 The bill would have enabled employees to timely sue
based on receipt of each discriminatory paycheck. Republicans, however, opposed the bill, arguing, inter alia, that it was anti-business.466 Republican opposition, led by presidential candidate Senator John McCain (R-A.Z.),
squashed the bill in the Senate.467 McCain’s opposition to the bill catalyzed
Ledbetter, a force majeure, to back the presidential bid of Barack Obama, who
supported the legislation.468 With an upcoming presidential election, the con458
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Address at the 20th Annual Leo and Berry Eizenstat Memorial Lecture:
The Role of Dissenting Opinions (Oct. 21, 2007) (transcript available at http://www.supremecourtus.
gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_10-21-07.html [https://perma.cc/NC6T-YZRW]).
459
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“As in 1991, the Legislature may act to
correct this Court’s parsimonious reading of Title VII.”).
460
Guinier, supra note 398, at 543–45 (quoting Jessica Savage, Ginsburg’s Famous White Gloves
Finally Come Off, MOTHER JONES (June 1, 2007), http://www.motherjones.com/ mojoblog/archives/
2007/05/4556_ginsburgs_famou.html [https://perma.cc/AU62-MT67]). Professor Guinier notes that
“Ginsburg’s dissent did not cause Congress to pass the Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, but did play a
role.” Id. at 556.
461
Id. at 541–42.
462
See id. at 542.
463
Id. at 543–45.
464
Id. at 544–45.
465
H.R. 2831, 110th Cong. (2007).
466
See Carl Hulse, Republican Senators Block Pay Discrimination Measure, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
24, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/24/washington/24cong.html [https://perma.cc/4DCRP9QC].
467
See id.
468
Guinier, supra note 398, at 541–42.
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text was ripe for the bill’s politicization. Pay equity for women became a rallying cry for the Obama campaign, and ultimately led Congress to pass the Lilly
Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, the first statute enacted under the first Black
president.469 With the presidency and both houses of Congress Democratically
controlled, this historic civil rights law broke a ten-year streak in which Congress had not checked the Court through corrective legislation.470
In sum, this complicated confluence of factors, among others, gave Congress the capacity to launch its surgical strike at a procedural hurdle blocking
pay equity claims.
C. The New Civil Rights Act
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
are markedly different in scope, purpose, and history, Congress ultimately succeeded in enacting these distinct restorative civil rights bills to address regressive procedural civil rights jurisprudence. Today, the underlying conditions for
like restorative legislation are similarly complex and wildly in flux. Although
this Article does not purport to predict the likelihood of a restorative procedural civil rights act today, it offers insights into the sparks that may catalyze the
flame.
First, it seems clear that the quantity and quality of Supreme Court decisions countenance restorative law. As demonstrated in Part I, the cumulative
effect of procedural jurisprudence over the last several decades has been to
incrementally undermine robust constitutional and civil rights enforcement.471
This obstructionist trend is comprised of at least a dozen cases, all of which
significantly impact the future of constitutional and civil rights enforcement.
For example, Twombly and Iqbal block initial court access via a more arduous
pleading standard.472 Additionally, Wal-Mart undermines collective action via
tougher class certification, whereas TransUnion denies standing to greater
class members.473 Moreover, the arbitration caselaw is sweeping; from Circuit
City to Gilmer to EEOC v. Waffle House,474 which make Title VII, Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and ADA civil rights claims arbiId. at 544.
Id.
471
See, e.g., Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 131–32 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (observing that “a number of this Court’s cases . . . have pushed the pendulum far beyond a neutral attitude and endorsed a policy that strongly favors private arbitration,” expanding the scope “far
beyond the expectations” of the FAA’s drafters).
472
See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557–63 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
662, 684–85 (2009).
473
See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 355 (2011); TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,
141 S. Ct. 2190, 2200, 2208–09 (2021).
474
534 U.S. 279 (2002).
469
470
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trable respectively; to Concepcion and DIRECTV which authorize FAA preemption of state law; to Italian Colors and Epic Systems which permit class
arbitration bans. The obstructionist arbitration bench is even deeper than the
aforementioned. Thus, the caselaw trend justifies corrective legislation.
Second, some Justices have signaled that the Court has gone off-track in
its procedural jurisprudence. In powerful dissents, and even majority opinions,
Justices have emphasized the Court’s need to defer to lawmakers and Congress’s need to correct the Court when it’s wrong.
For example, Justice Stevens’s dissent in Twombly strongly rebukes the
Court’s creation of a new pleading standard, contrary to legislative intent:
This is a case in which the intentions of the drafters . . . all point
unmistakably in the same direction, yet the Court marches resolutely
the other way. . . . [T]hat the Court has announced a significant new
rule that does not even purport to respond to any congressional [or
rule] command is glaringly obvious.475
In TransUnion, the liberal wing joins Justice Thomas in his criticism of the
Court’s denial of standing to class members whose rights were clearly violated
under federal consumer law.476 Thomas concludes that this “remarkable” opinion rebukes precedent going back to the country’s founding and improperly
“relieve[s] the legislature” of its charge to engender and shape rights.477
Moreover, there has been significant criticism of the Court’s arbitration
jurisprudence, especially at the intersection with class actions.478 For example,
Justice Elena Kagan issued a strong dissent in Italian Colors, criticizing the
majority for undermining the goals of the FAA, the Sherman Act, and other
federal statutes—in contravention of congressional intent.479 Her dissent admonishes the Court for its “betrayal of” the law and for enabling arbitration to
be used to “chok[e] off a plaintiff’s ability to enforce congressionally created
rights.”480 She also criticizes the Court’s disdain for class actions.481
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 596 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2218, 2221 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
477
Id. at 2221; see also id. at 2226 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“[C]ourts should give deference to
those congressional judgments.”).
478
See Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 132 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“There is little
doubt that the Court’s interpretation of the [FAA] has given it a scope far beyond the expectations of
the Congress that enacted it.” (first citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 17–21 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); and then citing id. at 21–36 (O’Connor, J., dissenting))).
479
See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 253 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting);
see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 361–62 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Court should interpret the FAA consistent with congressional intent).
480
Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 240 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,
136 S. Ct. 463, 476, 478 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (criticizing DIRECTV for going “beyond
475
476
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Similarly, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg issued a scathing rebuke of Epic
Systems, calling the decision “egregiously wrong” and reading her dissent from
the bench in defiance.482 In a dissent longer than the majority opinion, Ginsburg bemoaned that the latter would pilot “underenforcement of . . . statutes
designed to advance the well-being of vulnerable workers.”483 Thus,
“[c]ongressional correction of the Court’s elevation of the FAA over workers’
rights to act in concert is urgently in order.”484 Indeed, both the Epic Systems
majority and dissent call for congressional action. Justice Gorsuch’s majority
opinion acknowledged that the case raised policy concerns, but that it was not
the Court’s job to substitute its preferences for those of the people; meaning
that Congress could amend the FAA.485 Commentators on both sides echo the
Gorsuch-Ginsburg plea to Congress.486
In toto, these dissents are demosprudential “clarion calls”487 for legislative
reform, reflecting disapproval of the Court’s move away from congressional
and rule-maker intent. These opinions may in fact understate the extent of judicial discontent. Given the acute partisanship and congressional gridlock today, Justices may be less likely to recommend that Congress take corrective
action.
Finally, the current complexity of the political landscape and degree of
societal turmoil admittedly make it difficult to project whether restorative procedural law could succeed today. Contemporary American society has been
situated in an economic crisis, global pandemic, and robust civil rights and
racial justice movements. On many fronts, principled leadership has been replaced with bias, ignorance, and untruthfulness, leading to chaos, instability,
and conflict.

Concepcion and Italian Colors” in expanding the scope of the FAA to benefit “powerful economic
entities” and “further degrade[] the rights of consumers”).
481
See Italian Colors, 570 U.S. at 252 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
482
Howe, supra note 248.
483
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1646 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
484
Id. at 1633.
485
Id. at 1632 (majority opinion).
486
Compare Benjamin Robbins, Symposium: The Federal Arbitration Act and the National Labor
Relations Act Are Two Ships That Pass in the Night, SCOTUSBLOG (May 21, 2018), https://www.
scotusblog.com/2018/05/symposium-the-federal-arbitration-act-and-the-national-labor-relations-actare-two-ships-that-pass-in-the-night/ [https://perma.cc/X8DH-46DF] (“Congress, and Congress alone,
is free to respond to the decision by amending either [the FAA or NLRA].”), with Nicole G. Berner &
Claire Prestel, Symposium: Latest Assault Against Workers by the Supreme Court, SCOTUSBLOG
(May 22, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/05/symposium-latest-assault-against-workers-bythe-supreme-court/ [https://perma.cc/VQ2G-QK5Z] (“We must now call upon our elected officials to
stand with everyday working Americans to reverse the damage of yesterday’s ruling.”).
487
Guinier, supra note 398, at 543.
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If Congress were to reform civil procedure, there is a risk that Congress
may make it more exclusionary.488 Some legislators prefer the status quo and
support the Court’s efforts to block access to a litigation system beleaguered by
bourgeoning dockets, expensive and time-consuming discovery, and alleged
meritless claims. They have spearheaded initiatives to diminish litigation489
with varied success.490
There is also the risk that Congress would roll back civil rights by making
it more difficult to bring and litigate cases, which it has tried. Such efforts include limiting remedies, diminishing fees for plaintiffs’ lawyers, and eliminating fee-shifting provisions that incentivize lawyers to take civil rights cases.491
Congress has also tinkered on the edges, accomplishing retrenchment through
targeted actions.492 It has sought to do procedurally what it could not do substantively.493
Despite past retrenchment efforts, corrective legislation should be tried.
As illustrated by the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Ledbetter Act, it may
take multiple attempts for restorative legislation to succeed. There are signs
that it is time.
First, significant political shifts may offer an opportunity for procedural
reform. The election of President Joe Biden, a Democrat, could enhance the
prospect of a restorative civil rights bill—similar to that of Barack Obama’s
election and the Ledbetter Act. The congressional power shift is also salient.
Republicans lost their majority in the House in the midterm election of November 2018, creating the first split between the two major parties between the

488
Glover, supra note 11, at 2114 (“[R]ecent procedural reforms . . . restrict access to justice and
rule of law rather than preserve it.”).
489
Id. at 2130 (arguing that the rule of law is “under direct attack from elected members of [the]
federal . . . government[]” due to corporate interests in procedural lawmaking).
490
Compare Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency
Act of 2016, H.R. 1927, 114th Cong. (2016) (failing to become a law), and Fairness in Class Action
Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of 2017 (FICALA), H.R. 985, 115th
Cong. (2017) (same), with Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (succeeding in becoming a law). See Glover, supra note 11, at
2119–25, 2128 (explaining how FICALA’s multidistrict litigation reforms would infringe on judicial
power and managerial discretion and repress rule-of-law norms that harm meritorious cases).
491
See, e.g., History and Tradition Protection Act of 2021, H.R. 2224, 117th Cong. (2021); Stop
Trial Lawyer Pork Act, H.R. 7080, 110th Cong. (2008); Judicial Reform Act of 1982, S. 3018, 97th
Cong. (1982); Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act of
2017, H.R. 985; Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, § 803(d), 110 Stat. 1321,
1321-71 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e) (enacted).
492
Rosenbaum, supra note 281, at 765; see also Bone, supra note 313, at 921 (observing that
Congress has “tinker[ed]” with the federal rules to address particular substantive areas, rather than
doing an overhaul).
493
Rosenbaum, supra note 281, at 765.
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House and Senate in over three decades.494 Moreover, Democrats and Republicans are now tied in the Senate—a rare feat.495 With a Democratic Vice President, Kamala Harris, Democrats have the slimmest possible margin in the Senate to pass legislation.496 To the extent that Republicans spearhead procedural
retrenchment, this development bodes well for potential corrective legislation.
Second, the greater demographic and viewpoint diversity of Congress today may increase the likelihood of a procedural civil rights act.497 The 117th
Congress is the “most diverse ever” along axes including age, geography, gender, LGBTQ identity, veteran status, race, and ethnicity.498 The previous Congress was also the “most diverse in congressional history, with more women
and racial and ethnic minorities than any previous Congress. . . . [It also had]
the largest number of new members who’ve served in the military in over a
decade . . . .”499 The change in demographics is not cosmetic; research shows
that varied life experiences and backgrounds impact priorities and policy initiatives.500 The addition of this diverse pool has not only improved the quality
494
See Congress Profiles: 99th Congress (1985–1987), U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES:
HIST., ART & ARCHIVES, https://history.house.gov/Congressional-Overview/Profiles/99th/ [https://
perma.cc/6BBX-LX9D].
495
Abigail Abrams, What Really Happens When There’s a 50-50 Split in the Senate?, TIME (Jan.
12, 2021), https://time.com/5926759/senate-split-50-50-democrats/ [https://perma.cc/8C7U-9ABT].
496
This majority has proved more fragile than expected. See Chris Cillizza, Joe Biden Said Two
Democratic Senators Vote with Republicans More Than Their Own Party. Is He Right?, CNN, https://
www.cnn.com/2021/06/02/politics/joe-biden-kyrsten-sinema-joe-manchin/index.html [https://perma.
cc/V8Y4-EECJ] (June 2, 2021) (noting that Senators Joe Manchin (W. Va.) and Kyrsten Sinema
(Ariz.) are “the two most likely Democrats to side with Republicans when it comes to critical votes”).
497
See KNOCK DOWN THE HOUSE (Netflix 2019).
498
Maya King, This Congress Is the Most Diverse Ever. But Hill Staffers Remain Overwhelmingly
White., POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/02/23/people-of-color-congress-hill-staffers471019 [https://perma.cc/MPS2-7L98] (Feb. 23, 2021) (noting that there has been a ninety-seven
percent increase in racial and ethnic diversity over the last ten Congresses); Brooke Minters, Eugene
Daniels, Krystal Campos & Michael Cadenhead, They’re Coming in Hot: The Best Quotes from Our
Interviews with Congress’ Most Diverse Freshman Class, POLITICO, https://www.politico.com/news/
2021/04/26/new-117th-congress-freshman-members-diversity-2021-483987 [https://perma.cc/2FXWMSZC] (Apr. 26, 2021) (“The past six congresses have increasingly bested the last . . . .”); Katherine
Schaeffer, Racial, Ethnic Diversity Increases Yet Again with the 117th Congress, PEW RSCH. CTR.
(Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2021/01/28/racial-ethnic-diversity-increasesyet-again-with-the-117th-congress/ [https://perma.cc/BKK9-U5GZ].
499
Kenneth Lowande, Melinda Ritchie & Erinn Lauterbach, Having the Most Diverse Congress
Ever Will Affect More Than Just Legislation, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2019/01/09/having-the-most-diverse-congress-ever-will-affect-morethan-just-legislation/ [https://perma.cc/98X8-WKJJ] (describing the 116th Congress).
500
See Sarah Kliff, The Research Is Clear: Electing More Women Changes How Government
Works, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2016/7/27/12266378/electing-women-congress-hillary-clinton
[https://perma.cc/4XB7-H9VB] (Mar. 8, 2017); German Lopez, This Is the Most Diverse Congress
Ever. But It’s Still Pretty White., VOX (Feb. 8, 2019), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/
2/8/18217076/congress-racial-diversity-white [https://perma.cc/C5JK-KQR5]; Lowande et al., supra
note 499.
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of governing, but moved the dial toward grassroots-oriented representation and
demosprudence.501
Third, there is common ground that cuts across political affiliation that
may support significant procedural reform. On the one hand, the extremely
polarized current political climate suggests that no matter how warranted a
legislative fix, its passage is unlikely. “The [recent] level of congressional polarization is the highest since the Civil War.”502 Some characterize this as a
period of “hyper-partisanship.”503 “Congress’s productivity as a legal institution as measured in bills passed and enacted is down sharply” and “[a]nalysis
of voting records shows almost complete elimination in recent years of the
overlap in the center between the two parties.”504 Ideologically poled parties
and “insecure” majorities have undermined bipartisan legislation. Although
Democrats safely controlled Congress from 1955 to 1981, since then the two
major parties have vied for Senate control.505 As scholars have concluded, “All
of this creates a partisan, polarized, and impotent Congress in a system of separated powers.”506 Thus, Congress’s coalescing around corrective legislation
seems unlikely.
On the other hand, some contend that pronounced congressional polarization is unexceptional in the United States,507 and “although current levels of
partisan misbehavior and media manipulation are undoubtedly high, they may
See KNOCK DOWN THE HOUSE, supra note 497; Lowande et al., supra note 499.
Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1705 (2015); see James Willis, Congressional Polarization Is Worse Than We
Think, MEDIUM (Sept. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/@jamesrawillis/congressional-polarization-isworse-than-we-think-f799dcd2ebf6 [https://perma.cc/YC7T-22SJ] (noting that polarization has held
steady from 2015 to 2018).
503
Dakota S. Rudesill, Hyper-Partisanship and the Law: Framing the Debate, 10 GEO. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 343, 343–46 (2012) (describing Congress’s dysfunction due to hyper-partisanship).
504
Id. at 343–44 (first citing Jennifer Steinhauer, Congress Nearing End of Session Where Partisan Input Impeded Output, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2012, at A21; then citing Dylan Matthews, 17 Bills
That Likely Would Have Passed the Senate if It Didn’t Have the Filibuster, WASH. POST BLOG (Dec.
5, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/12/05/17-bills-that-likely-wouldhave-passed-the-senate-if-it-didnt-have-the-filibuster/ [https://perma.cc/XN3J-HB9Q]; and then citing
JAMES A. THOMPSON, A HOUSE DIVIDED: POLARIZATION AND ITS EFFECT ON RAND (2010), https://
www.rand.org/pubs/occasional_papers/OP291.html [https://perma.cc/WR9U-9U8X]); see Willis, supra
note 502 (observing there is “no longer overlap” between the parties); see also Barbara Sinclair, Question: What’s Wrong with Congress? Answer: It’s a Democratic Legislature, 89 B.U. L. REV. 387,
387–88 (2009) (noting there were “thirty-six filibusters in the 109th Congress (2005–06) and fifty-two
in the . . . 110th Congress” (citing Barbara Sinclair, The New World of U.S. Senators, in CONGRESS
RECONSIDERED 1, 7 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I. Oppenheimer eds., 2009))).
505
Copeland, supra note 369, at 815–17.
506
Id. at 819.
507
Farina, supra note 502, at 1702–03; see id. at 1705 (finding that perception of “‘normal’ levels
of partisan conflict is skewed by an era of bipartisan harmony purchased with racial appeasement”);
see also Willis, supra note 502 (examining the history of congressional polarization).
501
502
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not be historical anomalies.”508 Indeed, despite the contemporary stalemate,
Congress has been able to pass significant legislation,509 such as the Violence
Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013,510 the Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act,511 the Pay Our Military Act,512 and the
Never Forget the Heroes: James Zadroga, Ray Pfeifer, and Luis Alvarez Permanent Authorization of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund
Act.513 As the coronavirus stimulus package recently demonstrated, it seems
that during acute crises, fissures can narrow.514 Five coronavirus relief laws
were passed with substantial bipartisan support.515 Prompted by a failing economy and worsening global pandemic, Congress passed the largest economic
stimulus package in U.S. history.516
With the rarity of bipartisan legislation, what would compel cooperation
over a subject like civil procedure? Demosprudence might provide a clue. As
everyday people increasingly understand how procedure impacts their lives,
restorative legislation becomes more possible. One of the most salient developments that could catalyze Congress to draft corrective civil rights legislation
is the contemporary racial justice movement. The activism by Black Lives
Matter (“BLM”) and its allies across the country—and the world—pushes to
the fore the need to challenge injustice and systemic racism in all its forms.517
The grassroots demand for serious change suggests that the time is ripe for
stronger civil rights protections.
This is not to diminish the significant backlash that the modern racial justice movement has experienced. The number of active hate groups rose signifiFarina, supra note 502, at 1705.
See Sinclair, supra note 504, at 389 (noting that the 2001–2006 congressional sessions, although “characterized by gridlock. . . . produced some highly significant legislation”).
510
Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 54 (2013).
511
Pub. L. No. 113-183, 128 Stat. 1919 (2014).
512
Pub. L. No. 113-39, 127 Stat. 532 (2013).
513
Pub. L. No. 116-34, 133 Stat. 1040 (2019); see also id. (continuing the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001’s funding until 2092, passing the House 402–12 and the Senate 97–2).
514
See, e.g., Coronavirus Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2020,
Pub. L. No. 116-123, 134 Stat. 146 (2020).
515
Id.; Families First Coronavirus Response Act, Pub. L. No. 116-127, 134 Stat. 178 (2020);
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, 134 Stat. 281
(2020); Paycheck Protection Program and Health Care Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 116-139, 134
Stat. 620 (2020); American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, 135 Stat. 4 (2021).
516
Sarah D. Wire, Senate Passes $2-Trillion Economic Stimulus Package, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 25,
2020), https://www.latimes.com/politics/story/2020-03-25/vote-senate-on-2-trillion-economic-stimuluspackage-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/3NTA-AXUF].
517
See, e.g., Kari Paul, These Are All the Companies Trying to Stop White Supremacists from Raising Money, MKT. WATCH (Aug. 20, 2017), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/discover-terminatesmerchant-agreements-with-white-supremacist-groups-following-moves-by-paypal-and-godaddy2017-08-16 [https://perma.cc/5E3X-MRSY].
508
509
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cantly from 2008 to 2012, following President Barack Obama’s election.518
White nationalist hate groups rose fifty-five percent under the Trump administration.519 FBI statistics also reveal that hate crimes jumped twenty percent
during this time, with the vast majority committed by white supremacists.520
Substantive civil rights like voting, affirmative action, and police reform along
axes of race are under fierce attack.521
Other social justice movements have specifically targeted seemingly innocuous procedural tactics that strip vulnerable groups of meaningful court
access. For example, #MeToo and Time’s Up have challenged mandatory arbitration agreements, non-disclosure agreements (“NDAs”), and confidentiality
provisions.522 Gig economy workers have engaged in massive walkouts and put
significant pressure on employers to reform.523 In response, some private companies have dispensed with mandatory arbitration for sexual harassment, sexual
assault, and other claims.524 Some state legislatures have followed suit.525
See S. POVERTY L. CTR., THE YEAR IN HATE AND EXTREMISM 2020, at 3 (2020).
Jason Wilson, White Nationalist Hate Groups Have Grown 55% in Trump Era, Report Finds,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/18/white-nationalisthate-groups-southern-poverty-law-center [https://perma.cc/R83M-UBLH].
520
Daniel Villarreal, Hate Crimes Under Trump Surged Nearly 20 Percent Says FBI Report,
NEWSWEEK (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.newsweek.com/hate-crimes-under-trump-surged-nearly-20percent-says-fbi-report-1547870 [https://perma.cc/K365-EPXM]. There were 838 active hate groups
in the United States in 2020. See S. POVERTY L. CTR., supra note 518, at 4.
521
See Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Opinion, Racial Justice Demands Affirmative Action, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/02/opinion/college-discrimination-whites-donald-trump.html [https://perma.cc/XK3D-X7QP].
522
See generally Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards Justice in
Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155 (2019) (exploring how mandatory arbitration clauses have obstructed civil rights litigation, using #MeToo as a case study); Kathleen McCullough, Mandatory Arbitration and Sexual Harassment Claims: #MeToo- and Time’s UpInspired Action Against the Federal Arbitration Act, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 2653, 2669–77 (2019)
(discussing federal efforts to limit arbitration).
523
See supra notes 250–280 and accompanying text.
524
Adi Robertson, Facebook Is Ending Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment Complaints, THE
VERGE (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.theverge.com/2018/11/9/18079462/facebook-forced-arbitrationend-sexual-harassment-dating-policy-update [https://perma.cc/RNG4-MVBE] (stating that Facebook,
Google, Microsoft, Uber, Lyft are no longer requiring arbitration of sexual harassment claims); Didi
Martinez, Facebook, Airbnb and eBay Join Google in Ending Forced Arbitration for Sexual Harassment Claims, NBC NEWS (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/facebookairbnb-ebay-join-google-ending-forced-arbitration-sexual-harassment-n935451 [https://perma.cc/U92JJQR4]; Casey Newton, Google and Facebook Employees Are Teaming Up Against Their Bosses, THE
VERGE (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/1/15/18182974/google-forced-arbitrationprotest-facebook [https://perma.cc/8FPW-GZZU] (stating that mandatory arbitration agreements “silenc[e] survivors, while shielding serial predators”); Levi Sumagaysay, Google Ending Forced Arbitration After Worker Push, but Fight Isn’t Over, MERCURY NEWS, https://www.mercurynews.com/
2019/02/22/google-ending-forced-arbitration-after-worker-push-but-fight-isnt-over/ [https://perma.cc/
7SF7-JJT3] (Feb. 23, 2019) (ending mandatory arbitration and class arbitration bans as of March 21,
2019, while workers continue to seek legislation to expand their effort).
518
519
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Procedural justice took center stage in the 2020 Democratic primary presidential campaign. Candidate Senator Elizabeth Warren’s My Plan to End
Washington Corruption proposed three action steps to “ensur[e] access to justice for all”: banning forced arbitration agreements in civil rights, employment,
and other cases; forbidding mandatory class action waivers in the same; and
restoring fair pleadings standards to ensure that all those harmed have their
“day in court.”526
Congress has also responded piecemeal and with varied success.527 It has
achieved the most success in shielding favored groups from pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agreements under various statutes,528 such as military families challenging draconian payday loans,529 whistleblowers exposing violations
of federal securities law,530 and certain employees fighting sexual assaults and
sexual harassment on the job.531 Dozens of federal agencies under Republican
and Democratic administrations have also regulated arbitration for constituencies such as “farmers, students, airline passengers, workers, and nursing-home
patients, among others . . . .”532
525
See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12.7(a), (b) (West 2022) (arbitration); id. § 10:5-12.8(a), (b)
(NDAs); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5003-b (McKinney 2022) (NDAs); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 495h(h)(2)
(2022) (arbitration); id. § 495h(g)(1) (NDAs); 2018 Wash. Sess. Laws 692; S.B. 697A, 2021–2022
Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021) (arbitration); Stand Together Against Non-Disclosures (“STAND”) Act, S.B.
820 (Cal. 2018) (codified as amended at CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1001 (West 2022)) (NDAs); Disclosing Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Act of 2018, H.B. 1596, 2018 Sess. (Md. 2018) (codified
as amended at MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 3-715 (LexisNexis 2018)) (arbitration).
526
Elizabeth Warren, My Plan to End Washington Corruption, MEDIUM (Sept. 16, 2019), https://
medium.com/@teamwarren/my-plan-to-end-washington-corruption-554c7f01aaa5 [https://perma.cc/
RJR9-XUDA].
527
See, e.g., Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, 111th Cong. (2010); Arbitration
Fairness Act of 2015, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. § 3(a) (2015); Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests
of the States Act of 2016, S. 2506, 114th Cong. § 3(b) (2016); see McCullough, supra note 522, at
2669–77 (listing federal responses).
528
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. 1226(a)(2) (covering auto dealers); Food, Conservation, and Energy Act
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-246, § 11005, 122 Stat. 1651, 2119 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 197c(a)) (covering livestock producers).
529
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-364,
120 Stat. 2083 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 987(f)(4)) (covering members of the armed forces and their
dependents subject to payday loans); Military Lending Act, 10 U.S.C. § 987(e) (covering armed services members with consumer loans).
530
See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 922(a), 124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6).
531
See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, § 8116, 123
Stat. 3409, 3454–55 (2009) (prohibiting defense contracts over $1,000,000 from having mandatory
arbitration agreements covering Title VII and tort claims involving sexual assault or sexual harassment); Fair Pay and Safe Workplaces, Exec. Order No. 13,673, 3 C.F.R. 283 (2015) (extending the
same to additional federal contractors).
532
Brief of American Association for Justice as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents in Nos.
16-285 & 16-300 and Pet. in No. 16-307 at 8, Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018); see
id. at 8–14 (describing various protective rules and beneficiaries).
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In a rare moment of bipartisanship,533 Congress recently passed the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021,
which amends the FAA to bar pre-dispute arbitration agreements and joint action waivers534 in cases involving sexual assault and sexual harassment
claims.535 Although the prohibition is only triggered by the presence of these
specific claims, it covers all arbitration agreements (not just those in employment contracts), and covers all class action bans (not just those in arbitration).
Characterized as “one of the most significant changes to employment law in
years,” the bill recognizes the deep flaws of these procedural mechanisms and
protects a broader swath of victims in their wake.536 Notably, Republican lawmakers fault these processes for being secretive, biased, unconscionable “legal
traps” that protect sexual abusers and harassers, and prevent victims from coming “out of the shadows,” getting their “day in court,” and securing justice.537
The House report reveals the tipping point has been reached, with
“[eighty-four percent] of Americans across the political spectrum support[ing]
ending forced arbitration in employment and consumer disputes.”538 The bill’s
original 2017 co-sponsors, Senator Kirsten Gillibrand (D-N.Y.) and Senator
Lindsey Graham (R-S.C.), successfully drew in fellow co-sponsors ranging
from Texas to Colorado to California.539 Notably, a bipartisan group of state
attorneys general from all fifty states, D.C., and the U.S. territories backed the
legislation.540 Helping to bridge the political divide, broadcaster Gretchen
Carlson—well-known for her sexual harassment lawsuit against Fox News
CEO Roger Ailes—fought for the bill’s passage.541 The work of #MeToo,
Time’s Up, and others culminated in serious legislation, demonstrating that
533
The bill passed in the House 335–97—all opposition came from Republicans, though more
Republicans voted for the bill than against it—and passed in the Senate unanimously by voice vote.
See Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault & Sexual Harassment Act of 2021, H.R. 4445, 117th
Cong. (2021).
534
For example, class action bans.
535
Pub. L. No. 117-90, 136 Stat. 26 (2022).
536
Debra Cassens Weiss, Congress Passes Bill Banning Forced Arbitration of Harassment and
Sexual Assault Claims, ABA J. (Feb. 10, 2022), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/congresspasses-bill-banning-forced-arbitration-of-harassment-and-sexual-assault-claims [https://perma.cc/6JWGYJNM] (quoting Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer (D-N.Y.)).
537
See Press Release, U.S. Rep. Kathy Castor (R-Fla.), Rep. Castor Helps Pass Groundbreaking
Labor Bill to End Forced Arbitration for Sexual Assault and Harassment (Feb. 8, 2022), https://castor.
house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=403786 [https://perma.cc/4A87-5ZML]; ENDING
FORCED ARBITRATION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT ACT OF 2021, H.R. REP.
NO. 117-234, at 3 (2022).
538
H.R. REP. NO. 117-234, at 6 & n.29.
539
Additional co-sponsors include Florida, Virginia, New York, Washington, Georgia and North
Carolina.
540
H.R. REP. NO. 117-234, at 11 n.68.
541
Weiss, supra note 536.
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demosprudence is alive and well.542 It is time to go even further, to cover a
greater array of procedural barriers and a broader swath of Americans. The
next Part explores how this might proceed.
IV. WHAT WOULD A CIVIL RIGHTS PROCEDURAL
RESTORATION ACT LOOK LIKE?
Although there are different ways to swing back the pendulum from a restrictive to liberal ethos, this Part flags strategies for consideration and sets
forth broadly what a civil rights procedural restorative act might contain.543
Section A puts forth several strategic suggestions for reform.544 Section B
makes specific suggestions for reform in the areas of pleadings, class actions,
and arbitration.545
A. Strategic Guidance for Charting a New Path
First, corrective legislation should offer unambiguous text. Although the
Court has significant interpretive discretion, a law can, at least facially, cabin
such discretion by making substance-specific procedure explicit.546
Second, civil rights corrective legislation should address not only Supreme Court jurisprudence but that of lower federal courts, who plant the obstructionist seeds, decide most cases, and usually have the last word.547 For
example, scholars have documented that lower-court-created legal doctrine has
stymied much anti-employment-discrimination law.548 They have also documented the ways that lower-court judges justify pro-defendant outcomes in
employment discrimination cases through decision heuristics.549 Such jurisprudence may contribute to plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases winning
less frequently at summary judgment, at trial, and on appeal than other civil

542 Carlson sums it up well: “Marching in the streets can inspire us. Editorials can open our minds.
Hashtags can galvanize, but legislation is the only thing that lasts . . . .” Michelle L. Price, Congress
Approves Sex Harassment Bill in #MeToo Milestone, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Feb. 10, 2022), https://ap
news.com/article/joe-biden-business-kirsten-gillibrand-arts-and-entertainment-sexual-misconduct-e210
bde4bd0efb3cbdb6bf344363d5eb [https://perma.cc/9CVD-RXET].
543
See infra notes 546–604 and accompanying text.
544
See infra notes 546–552 and accompanying text.
545
See infra notes 553–604 and accompanying text.
546
But see AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 357 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(bemoaning federal preemption conclusion despite FAA’s contrary savings clause).
547
Selmi, supra note 381, at 301–04.
548
See SANDRA F. SPERINO & SUJA A. THOMAS, UNEQUAL: HOW AMERICA’S COURTS UNDERMINE DISCRIMINATION LAW 163 (2017).
549
Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 109, 116–23 (2012), https://www.yale
lawjournal.org/forum/losers-rules [https://perma.cc/N5EF-VH59].
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plaintiffs.550 This trend suggests that corrective legislation should affirmatively
target exclusionary jurisprudence from the ground up.
Third, restorative legislation should explicitly protect civil rights. This
would compel detractors to oppose a pro-civil rights bill, a potentially politically costly move.551
Finally, Congress should ensure that any private cause of action in restorative legislation tracks a historical or common-law claim with a concrete injury
similar to that under the federal statute to avoid a standing problem per
TransUnion.552
B. Components of a Civil Rights Procedural Statutory Fix
Restorative civil rights legislation could go in numerous directions and
take many forms.553 For each of the three procedural areas examined above—
pleadings, class actions, and arbitration—contrary Supreme Court precedents
should be overturned and replaced with standards hewing closer to the intent
of the rule-makers and legislators. Each of the areas is addressed in turn.
In the area of pleadings, corrective civil rights legislation should overturn
Twombly and Iqbal to the extent that these cases exceed the notice pleading
standard set forth in Conley.554 Rather than requiring plaintiffs to show their
claims are plausible, they need only show their claims are possible. Restoration
of such notice pleading would realign the pleading standard with the drafters’
intent to maximize court access and merits determinations, and discourage unchecked subjectivity built into the plausibility inquiry.555
In the event that such macro reform is unfeasible, Congress should instead strike surgically by addressing pleadings problems specific to constitutional and civil rights cases. For example, Congress could provide meaningful
factors for judges to employ rather than just their “judicial experience and
common sense,” for determining claim plausibility.556 For cases involving intentional discrimination allegations and informational asymmetry between the
550
Wendy Parker, Juries, Race, and Gender: A Story of Today’s Inequality, 46 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 209, 209 (2011).
551
See BURBANK & FARHANG, supra note 145, at 50–54.
552
See Part I.
553
The precise contours are beyond the scope of this Article.
554
See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
557–63 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 684–85 (2009).
555
See, e.g., Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009) (restoring
Conley standard); Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, 111th Cong. (2010) (overruling
Twombly and Iqbal and advising against a heightened standard); see Mike Dorf, Senator Specter’s
Notice Pleading Parting Shot, DORF ON L. (Dec. 28, 2010), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2010/12/
senator-specters-notice-pleading.html [https://perma.cc/MC8F-VW8R].
556
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
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parties, Congress could make explicit judges’ power to permit some limited
discovery to discern plausibility before ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
motion.557
In the area of class actions, corrective civil rights legislation should overturn Wal-Mart to the extent that it heightens the class certification standard for
Title VII cases.558 This would entail returning to a normal proof threshold for
workers trying to meet the Rule 23(a) commonality standard when alleging
systemic discrimination. Thus, employees would no longer have to produce
“significant proof” that their employer “operated under a general policy of discrimination” to satisfy commonality.559 Moreover, the common question would
need not be central to the case, nor would common questions need to predominate outside a Rule 23(b)(3) class action.
Legislation should also clarify how commonality may be satisfied in employment discrimination cases. The Court concluded it was unbelievable that
an “undisciplined system of subjective [decision-making]” could be the common thread in the case,560 and could lead to most managers acting—even subconsciously—in a detrimental way to female employees’ careers.561 Legislation
should make clear that an employer’s decision to allow highly subjective, decentralized decision-making by local managers may constitute a “policy,”562
thereby satisfying the commonality requirement. This fix would realign the
commonality standard with the rule-makers’ intent to make joinder of parties
and claims generally easy and to make systemic civil rights cases more viable.
Corrective legislation should permit equitable forms of monetary relief,
such as back pay, to qualify for Rule 23(b)(2) certification. The new law would
correct Wal-Mart’s requirement that monetary relief be incidental to any injunctive or declaratory relief sought in a Rule 23(b)(2) class action563—a more
rigorous standard than the one that rule-makers articulated.564 The new law
should also consider whether punitive damages, because of their aggregate
nature, satisfy (b)(2). These changes would closer align the class certification
standard with the drafters’ intent to provide robust civil rights enforcement under Rule 23(b)(2).
A restorative civil rights law should also overturn Epic Systems,565 which
held that class actions were not the types of “concerted activities for the purSee Malveaux, supra note 47, at 132–41 (providing a blueprint for such a model).
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 353–55 (2011).
559
Id. (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)).
560
See id. at 355 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Tr., 487 U.S. 977, 990–91 (1988)).
561
See id.
562
Id. at 353.
563
Id. at 359–60.
564
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2) advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment.
565
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
557
558
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pose of . . . mutual aid or protection”566 that workers have a right to collectively participate in under the NLRA.567 The statute should be amended to explicitly include class actions as qualifying.568
New legislation to promote private enforcement of civil rights claims
could also resolve circuit splits over aggregation in important ways. The law
should: clarify that a putative class need only be defined by objective criteria
to satisfy ascertainability;569 allow Rule 23(c)(4) issue certification of a systemic discrimination question under Rule 23(b)(3) while leaving individual
damages determinations to separate trials; and clarify post-Campbell-Ewald
that under Rule 68, tendering complete relief to an individual named plaintiff
and entering judgment in their favor does not moot class claims in a putative
class action.
In the area of arbitration, corrective legislation should swing the pendulum back so individuals challenging discriminatory practices are not unwittingly deprived access to the court system because of mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration agreements. The Court’s jurisprudence would realign with the FAA
drafters’ intent that arbitration agreements be fairly assessed like other contracts, and be made voluntarily between entities of equal bargaining power to
resolve ordinary commercial disputes in federal court.
In order to achieve this, first, corrective legislation could prohibit predispute mandatory arbitration agreements involving constitutional, civil rights,
and employment claims altogether. The FAA did not originally cover such substantive areas,570 and they should remain outside the statute’s scope.571 This
course correction would effectively overturn cases like Circuit City, Gilmer,
and Waffle House, which acknowledged Title VII, ADEA, and ADA claims as
arbitrable respectively.572 This approach most directly and comprehensively
addresses the myriad problems posed by compulsory arbitration.
See 29 U.S.C. § 157; Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1625, 1632.
Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. at 1632.
568
See Protecting the Right to Organize (“PRO”) Act of 2021, H.R. 842, 117th Cong. § 104
(2021).
569
But see Fairness in Class Action Litigation and Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency Act
of 2017, H.R. 985, 115th Cong. § 103 (passed by House, March 9, 2017, not acted on by Senate).
When Congress sought to legislate ascertainability, the House required administrative feasibility. Rule
23(b)(2) suits seeking only injunctive or declaratory relief should be exempt from this. See Swadley,
supra note 162, at 410–16, 421–22; see, e.g., Shelton v. Bledsoe, 775 F.3d 554, 563 (3d Cir. 2015);
Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
570
Cohen & Dayton, supra note 187, at 281; Moses, Misconstruction, supra note 176, at 111.
571
See Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal (“FAIR”) Act, S. 505, 117th Cong. §3 (2021); FAIR
Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. §3 (2019); see also Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th
Cong. (2017) (finding that the Supreme Court erroneously interpreted the FAA).
572
See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 282, 298 (2002); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991); Cir. City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109–10 (2001).
566
567
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Alternatively, corrective legislation could target certain types of claimants
and claims. For example, Congress could amend the FAA exemption clause573
to clarify that the statute exempts all workers from its coverage. This would
take employment-contract claims out of the arbitral forum, effectively reversing Circuit City.574 As discussed supra, specific statutes already shield some
claimants from pre-dispute mandatory arbitration, including those who bring
cases involving sexual assault and sexual harassment claims.575 In the recent
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of
2021, Congress unequivocally condemns forcing victims to resolve their
grievances in arbitration because of its severe flaws.576 Remarkably, Republican lawmakers characterize the alternative forum as secretive, skewed, and
lacking coveted procedural protections such as appellate review.577 Republicans report that the advance agreements to use the forum are unconscionable
“legal traps” that shield sexual abusers and harassers and deny victims choice,
their “day in court,” and justice.578 Some Democrats have gone further, calling
such agreements “almost medieval . . . .”579 Lawmakers find such adhesion contracts implicating sexual misconduct so troubling that they have forbidden them
not only in employment contracts, but also in nursing home agreements, property leases, ride-share application policies, and various service commitments.580
This bill and others beg the question: why stop there? If mandatory predispute arbitration is unacceptable for military families being exploited by usurious loans, or whistleblowers trying to protect the integrity of securities laws, or
employees being sexually assaulted and harassed at work, why should it be acceptable for others where the consequences are similarly egregious or worse?581
A new civil rights act should build on the current bill—covering additional civil rights claims and claimants. This act should illuminate harassment and
violence based on race, wage theft, and a range of discriminatory and unfair

See FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 1.
See FAIR Act, S. 505, § 3; FAIR Act, H.R. 1423, § 3.
575
See Section III.C.
576
See H.R. 4445, 117th Cong. (2021).
577
See Press Release, U.S. Rep. Kathy Castor (R-Fla.), supra note 537; ENDING FORCED ARBITRATION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT ACT OF 2021, H.R. REP. NO. 117-234
(2022).
578
See Press Release, U.S. Rep. Kathy Castor (R-Fla.), supra note 537; H.R. REP. NO. 117-234.
579
Price, supra note 542 (quoting Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer as noting the agreements force employees “to shut up, not tell anyone about it and not seek justice”).
580
Weiss, supra note 536. The Act covers all types of cases, including those challenging mandatory arbitration in employment, consumer, and commercial contracts. See H.R. REP. NO. 117-234.
581
Unsuccessful efforts include: Fairness in Nursing Home Arbitration Act, H.R. 2812, 117th
Cong. (2021) (covering nursing home residents); Automobile Arbitration Fairness Act of 2008, H.R.
5312, 110th Cong. (2008) (covering car purchasers and leasers).
573
574
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labor practices.582 Protecting only those who have the capital and power to
lobby Congress—while leaving others to fend for themselves—risks creating
procedural castes, where some are entitled to deluxe process and others substandard.
A restorative civil rights bill should at least ensure that those who participate in arbitration do so voluntarily. This means that precedent holding adhesion contracts enforceable—such as Gilmer583 and Epic Systems584—would be
overturned.585 For example, conditioning employment on acceptance of predispute arbitration would be unlawful.586 Workers would have the power to learn
and discern whether arbitration benefits them. Permitting only post-dispute
arbitration agreements would de-link a worker’s livelihood from the decision
to arbitrate. This approach protects employees’ due process rights and meaningful freedom to contract, restoring integrity to process. Employers receive
the advantages of arbitration—including “efficiency, privacy, cost saving[,] . . .
litigation avoidance,” and enhanced employee relations, which may in turn
increase profits.587 This change in focus relieves caseloads, promotes settlement, and reconciles the civil court and arbitral fora.588
A restorative civil rights bill should also overturn Italian Colors to breathe
life back into the effective vindication rule, which allows arbitration so long as a
claimant can effectively vindicate substantive rights.589 The rule would apply not
only to arbitration contract terms that forbid “the assertion of certain statutory
rights,” but also to terms that block the implementation of those rights.590 This
change prevents arbitration from “choking off a plaintiff’s ability” to vindicate
congressionally developed rights.591

582
See OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 4445—ENDING FORCED ARBITRATION OF SEXUAL ASSAULT & HARASSMENT ACT OF 2021 (2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/HR-4445-

SAP.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WWP-HECQ].
583
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991).
584
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1643 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Oral Dissent of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg at 1:15–1:18, Epic Sys., 138 S. Ct. 1612 (No. 16-285) (Justice
Ginsberg reading her dissent from the bench and rebuking “arm-twisted, take-it-or-leave-it contracts”).
585
See, e.g., Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 279 (1995); Gilmer, 500 U.S.
at 26, 33.
586
Adhesion contracts could be banned beyond the employment context to cover consumer and
other transactions.
587
Suzette M. Malveaux, Is It the “Real Thing”? How Coke’s One-Way Binding Arbitration May
Bridge the Divide Between Litigation and Arbitration, 2009 J. DISP. RESOL. 77, 78.
588
See id. at 78–79.
589
See Part I.
590
Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 570 U.S. 228, 236 (2013).
591
Id. at 240 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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In the event that Congress does not prohibit pre-dispute arbitration
agreements, it should at least amend the FAA to require certain protections.
First, corrective legislation would be most powerful at the intersection of class
actions and arbitration, as demonstrated by Italian Colors.592 A new civil rights
act should prohibit class arbitration bans, giving individuals the option to act
collectively in this alternative forum. Thus, Concepcion—which prohibited a
state from finding contracts with class arbitration bans unconscionable—would
be overturned.593 The new federal law or amended FAA would affirmatively
state that class arbitration waivers are not allowed, especially where there is a
significant power differential.594 Permitting Rule 23 class actions and FLSA
collective actions would close a large loophole in law enforcement. The recent
Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Claims
Act of 2021 forbids joint action waivers, which goes beyond class actions and
beyond arbitration.595
Second, if pre-dispute arbitration agreements are permitted in employment contracts, one-way binding arbitration could be required. Under this arrangement, when an employee is required to use arbitration to resolve future
workplace disputes, the employee is given the unilateral option of rejecting the
arbitrator’s decision and seeking relief in court.596 This unilateral approach
promotes arbitration while protecting employee choice and court access.597
Third, if workers and others are compelled to arbitrate, the pool of arbitrators should be more diverse. For example, the pool of consumer and employment arbitrators at the largest providers—the American Arbitration Association
and JAMS—is 88% white and 77% male,598 a disparity that impacts outcomes
in cases involving discrimination, sexual harassment, and pay equity claims.599
Fourth, companies that shirk their obligation to pay individual arbitration
fees in mass arbitration should risk financial fines or contempt.600 A new federal law could benefit from what state laws are already doing.601

See id. at 233–35 (majority opinion).
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336–37, 351–52 (2011).
594
See, e.g., FAIR Act, S. 505, 117th Cong. § 2(2) (2021); FAIR Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong.
§ 2(2) (2019).
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See H.R. 4445, 117th Cong. (2021).
596
See Malveaux, supra note 587, at 80; see also Stone & Colvin, supra note 224, at 23–24 (explaining how one company has begun using this approach).
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Malveaux, supra note 587, at 78.
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Vivia Chen, Is the White, Male World of Arbitration Ready for Diversity?, BLOOMBERG L.
(Aug. 13, 2021), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/business-and-practice/is-the-white-male-world-ofarbitration-ready-for-diversity [https://perma.cc/PU39-LDG5].
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Law” (quoting Marcie Dickson)).
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Finally, given the lack of transparency in arbitration, employers should be
required to provide information on whether they have mandatory arbitration
agreements and embedded class action bans. The frequency and outcomes of
arbitration and civil disputes would also be useful for comparative analysis.
Reporting requirements to a federal agency would enable stakeholders to have
a better understanding of problems and best practices. A federal law could follow similar state-law data collection requirements.602
Alternatively, if Congress does not provide greater protections and raise
the floor on a federal level, it should allow states to do so. Instead of FAA
preemption of state law—concretized in Concepcion and DIRECTV—the
states would determine the propriety, scope, and characteristics of arbitration
agreements, beyond the narrow check currently permitted.603 In a nod to federalism, corrective legislation would overturn Concepcion and DIRECTV and
expand the FAA’s basis for invalidating an arbitration agreement—“grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of a contract”—to include state law
and court decisions that define unconscionability, no meeting of the minds, or
other voiding contract law or policy.604
In sum, there is no dearth of creative ideas and ways Congress could draw
the civil justice system circle wider. These turbulent times beckon Congress to
open the courthouse doors for us all.
CONCLUSION
It is time for the pendulum to swing from an exclusive to an inclusive civil litigation paradigm. The Court’s modern jurisprudence has veered far from
where Congress and the federal rule-makers envisioned to ensure the proper
balance between Rule 1’s efficiency and justice values. With the enforcement
of employment, constitutional, and civil rights in jeopardy, timing is of the essence. As reminded by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “Once again, the ball is in
Congress’ court.”605 It is time for a new civil rights act.
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See, e.g., 2019 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 870, § 4 (West) (amending CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§ 1281.97 and adding § 1281.98).
602
See, e.g., id.
603
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336–43, 351–52 (2011); DIRECTV, Inc.
v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 465 (2015).
604
See Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2019, S. 635, 116th Cong.
§ 3(c) (2019).
605
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 661 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

